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ABSTRACT 
 Increased public attention to environmental disasters is reducing the likelihood firms can 
ascribe the consequential damages of stakeholders to “acts of Nature”.  This phenomenon 
indicates that the absence of top management team (TMT) attention to natural environmental 
issues leads a firm to control-reducing and likely-loss threats, but less is known about whether 
firms engage in environmental actions in response to technological disasters and why some firms 
actively undertake environmental action, while others do not. 
 Drawing on the attention-based view, I propose that technological disasters that happen 
in a focal firm’s affiliated industry cause a TMT to increase a firm’s environmental action, as 
mediated by the increased concerns and confidence about natural environmental issues.  Using 
10-year panel data, I found that TMT attention to the environmental issues was a key cognitive 
instrument that links technological disasters and a firm’s protective environmental actions.  
Furthermore, family influence and outside directors play critical roles in influencing a TMT to 
reframe its sensitive cognitive map on a technological disaster, and thus, to sense the signals 
from technological disasters in a strategic perspective.  
 My findings contribute to research on the attention-based view by applying the view to 
the natural environmental context, exploring a possible mediating effect of TMT attention 
between technological disasters and a firm’s environmental actions, and empirically testing 
conditional effects that will enhance TMT attention and environmental actions.  Providing the 
framework of how firms become environmentally responsible, I will discuss some insights into 
how firms adjust themselves to fit stakeholders’ expectations.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  
SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 The critical role of  top management team (TMT) attention to industrial events and 
changes such as deregulation and the introduction to technology has been studied by strategy 
researchers for decades (e.g., Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).  Indeed, TMT 
attention has provided a pivotal consensus about the direction of organizational actions (Ocasio, 
1997).  Recently, natural environmental issues have been increasingly a focused point for TMTs, 
as environmental disasters that damage stakeholders and communities are being vividly captured 
and reported by individuals who carry digital recording devices.   
 For instance, pictures and videos of the collapse of the Fukushima nuclear power plant hit 
by a tsunami and the BP oil spill that polluted a massive swath of the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 
quickly spread out through social networking services, and then public criticisms against the 
firms were heightened.  Due to the technology development, a natural environment segment that 
TMTs are facing has radically changed and charges overwhelming clean-up and follow-up 
protection costs to corresponding firms (de Villiers, Naiker, & van Staden, 2011).   
 Unlike competitive pressures that present both opportunities and threats (Sharma, 2000), 
environmental disasters that are characterized by sudden and devastating threats to organizations 
and stakeholders may require a TMT to experience a different decision-making process than the 
normal decision-making process that focuses on competitive events.  However, there is little 
empirical research on determinants of TMT attention to natural environmental issues that 
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possibly lead a firm to be committed to environmentally responsible actions for the prevention of 
the occurrence of technological disasters.   
Research Objectives 
Because a technological disaster is an industry-level phenomenon that influences all firms within 
an industry directly or indirectly through a shared reputation and a common fate (Barnett & 
King, 2008), a study on a firm-level internal process by which disastrous events are attended to 
by managers will be able to advance our understanding of the impact of unusual events that have 
been away from the primary domain where firms usually focus (e.g., industry) (Rerup, 2009), but 
are increasingly influential so that firms’ continuity could be threatened when environmental 
issues are less attended to(e.g., Freedom Industries filing for Chapter 11).   
  Researchers have examined why and how some events in relation to the natural 
environment generate the public attention inside and outside of an accident industry (Hoffman & 
Ocasio, 2001; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010).  Regarding a disaster as an event, Maitlis and Sonenshein 
(2010) examine how an accident firm enacts its environment and goes through sensemaking 
process, but few studies have investigated and empirically tested how other firms operating in 
the same industry with an accident firm respond to a disaster by attending to and taking actions 
against relevant issues to the natural environment.  Furthermore, little is known about why 
managers are encouraged to integrate environmental issues with a strategic planning process,  
how a technological disaster affects managerial attention, and under what conditions the level of 
impact gets stronger enough to activate a firm’s action responding to disasters.   
 A better understanding of why TMTs pay more attention to environmental issues in a 
decision-making process motivates me to develop a hypothesized model (See Figure 1) and to 
address the following four research questions; 1) Do firms respond to industry-wide 
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technological disasters caused by an accident firm operating in the same industry?  2) Why and 
how do firms respond to technological disasters in different manners?  3) Does TMT attention 
mediate a technological disaster and a firm’s environmental action as a response?  And 4) Under 
what conditions is the mediating effect of TMT attention on the relationship stronger or weaker?   
 
Figure 1 – Theoretical Model 
 
  
 Drawing on the attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997), I theorize and empirically test the 
impact of a technological disaster on TMT attention to natural environmental issues and how a 
TMT is motivated to adopt preventive strategic actions.  Particularly, social and cognitive 
processes constituting the attention-based view could provide better explanations and insights 
into the effects of interactions among multiple managers in TMT or TMT managers on attention 
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to environments (Cho & Hambrick, 2006)   I argue that attention plays a crucial role in 
promoting an organization-wide support for the development of environmental competency and 
protection.  Considering the importance of TMT attention, I propose that attention to natural 
environmental issues fully mediates the relationship between the occurrence of technological 
disasters and a firm’s environmental actions.  This implies that the TMT attention that acts not 
only as firm-level motivation but also a champion for highly risky environmental initiatives is a 
necessary condition for the development of environmental actions for a firm’s continuity 
(Andersson & Bateman, 2000; Ren & Guo, 2011).      
 My work will contribute to conceptualizing TMT attention to the natural environment 
and to establishing its mediating role between a technological disaster and a choice of 
environmental actions.  Ultimately, it will contribute to extending the attention-based view by 
incorporating the view into the environmental management literature. Using panel data, I will 
test the net effect of a technological disaster and examine a significant different in TMT attention 
between firms influenced by the disaster and those not.  Furthermore, I will also explore the 
boundary conditions of TMT attention by analyzing the conditional effect of corporate 
governance and vicarious learning on environmental actions, as mediated by TMT attention.  
Lastly, by highlighting the distinguishable effects of technological disasters from these of other 
types of disasters, this study advances our understanding of why firms actively but selectively 
respond to an environmental disaster.      
 I begin by defining a technological disaster and reviewing the attention-based view 
literature to examine why a TMT attends to a limited number of issues while forgoing others.  I 
discuss how corporate governance and vicarious learning moderate the impact of technological 
disasters on TMT attention to natural environmental issues.  I next describe methods and samples 
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to be utilized in this research, and conclude with the implication for future research in the 
environmental management literature.    
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CHAPTER TWO:  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Environmental Disaster 
 Environmental disasters have been studied with different labels, including massive 
discontinuous change (Winn et al., 2011), socio-technological disaster (Richardson, 1994), large-
scale organizational crisis (Pearson & Clair, 1998), and technological hazard (Appendix A).  A 
majority of definitions indicate that an environmental disaster is a cause of perceived crisis and 
characterized by low probability of occurrence but high impact on communal environments and 
stakeholders as well as a responsible firm for the disaster (Pearson & Clair, 1998).  Therefore, 
the occurrences of environmental disasters do necessarily involve considerable stakeholders’ 
perceptions on crisis, which are assumed to vary across the types of disaster, as well as lead to 
the sensemaking process of accident firms (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 2010)   
 While various definitions of an environmental disaster have been made in both 
management and non-management literatures, as shown in Appendix A, few studies have 
defined a technological disaster, particularly in the management literature and the border 
between a technological disaster and other types of disasters has been blurred (Shaluf, Ahmadun, 
& Said, 2003).  Distinguishing a technological disaster from others by definition and developing 
its construct is fundamental to advancing our understanding of the impact, mechanism, and role 
of a technological disaster caused by technical failures of a firm.  For the purpose, it is 
worthwhile to note that a common effect observed across various types of environmental 
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disasters is damages of organizations and communities in the three typical patterns of 
environmental disaster – natural, sequential, and technological.     
Natural Disaster 
 The first type of environmental disasters is natural disasters, caused by a force of nature 
(i.e., flood, earthquake, etc.).  Natural disasters directly damage visible assets such as properties, 
plants, and equipment of organizations.  For example, tsunamis engulf an industrial complex as 
well as residential areas, tornados and typhoons sweep inventory storages and manufacturing 
facilities, and landslides bury plants and groups of people.  The economic and non-economic 
damages occurred due to a natural disaster do not involve health problems that could remain for 
a long-term period due to oil and chemical spills and air contamination following the disasters 
(Boin, Van Duin, & Heyse, 2001). Natural disasters are considered uncontrollable acts of Nature 
and may directly generate massive damages to environments (Strömberg, 2007).   
Sequential Disaster 
 The second type of environmental disasters includes the disasters that initially hit and 
destroy properties, plants, and equipment of firms and then create second-order larger impacts on 
communities in various manners that toxic chemicals leaked from the destroyed facilities are 
spread throughout broad geographical areas.  One example of the damages of second-order 
impacts is the radioactive leakage from destroyed Fukushima nuclear plants by the tsunami that 
hit the Eastern ocean of Japan in 2011 (Dauer et al., 2011).  The boundary of second-order 
impacts extends to the distribution of secondary stakeholders who do not have “a formal 
contractual bond with the firm or direct legal authority over the firm” (Eesley & Lenox, 2006).  
The second-order impacts of a disastrous event trigger indirect turmoil into the quality of lives 
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for secondary stakeholders due to low attention to issues related to environment concerns (Walls, 
Berrone, & Phan, 2012).   
 When natural disasters directly hit facilities, they often inflict second-order impacts upon 
local communities by releasing environmentally hazardous substances into the natural 
environment, such as chemical release from plants in Louisiana damaged by Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 and Hurricane Gustav in 2008.  The problem with second-order impacts can be found in 
a societal phenomenon that a sequential disaster resulting from a natural disaster often brings 
about debates as to whether firms are responsible for the economic and environmental damages 
that initiated by natural disasters.  For example, on March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant was hard hit by an earthquake and ensuing Tsunami.  The first-order impacts 
of the Japanese Tsunami gave rise to a series of collapses of power facilities at the Fukushima 
Nuclear Power Plant (Aldrich, 2012).  As a result, the cooling system was disabled, causing the 
reactors to overheat and significant radiation leaks to spread out into the surrounding Fukushima 
area and eventually far off into the Pacific Ocean (Dauer et al., 2011).    
 The case brought by the earthquake and an ensuing Tsunami in Fukushima, Japan, 
demonstrates the seriousness of second-order impacts of a natural disaster - radiation leakage. It 
is notable that low identifiability of the direct association between acts of Nature and the 
consequential damage may lead the TMT members of the Tokyo Electricity Power (TEP) to 
perceive the second-order impacts that leave economic and environmental damages unavoidable.  
The concept of identifiability has been mainly explored in the micro-level management studies 
focusing on the social loafing in organizations (e.g., Liden et al., 2004).  When tasks assigned to 
individuals are identifiable, individuals tend to reduce social loafing because their effort is 
recognizable so that they could be more responsible for assigned tasks.  In the macro-level 
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management studies, an identifiable state refers to “assignment of identity that differentiates it (a 
current state) from what existed before” (Ford & Ford, 1994: p.767).    Shrivastava (1987) 
suggests that in order for an event to cause a crisis, a specific event should be “identifiable in 
time and place and traceable to specific man-made causes” (p.8).   
 When an event is not highly associated with damages, stakeholders who cannot 
differentiate the specific association from others tend to incorrectly ascribe the cause of damages 
to any firm in the same category or industry (Zavyalova et al., 2012).  In that sense, a firm’s 
active engagement in internal investigation with regard to environmental disasters could leave 
stakeholders an imprecise clue that the firm engaged has at least a partial responsibility for the 
disaster when a low identifiable disaster happens.  Thus, the low identifiability tends to make 
firms less responsive to an environmental disaster and does not lead them to adopt proactive 
environmental actions.  
Technological Disaster 
 The last type of environmental disasters represents the case that an environmental disaster 
takes place due to technological mistakes and causes massive damages to communal 
environments (Roberts, 1990; Reed & Fitzgerald, 2011).  For the most part, human, 
organizational, and technical factors are identified as factors that cause a technological disaster 
(Shrivastava, Mitroff, & Miller, 1988).   The BP Deepwater Horizon Oil spill that contaminated 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 and the chemical spill into West Virginia’s Elk River by Freedom 
Industries in 2014 are classified into this category.   
 The Deepwater Horizon was a semisubmersible offshore drilling rig that was contracted 
to BP by Transocean.  The rig was capable of drilling wells in excess of 35,000 feet while 
operating in water depths up to 10,000 feet.  It was operating in 5,000 feet of water on an oil well 
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(Baiocchi & Welser, 2010).  On April 20, 2010, Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank, as a 
remote switch failed to activate a blowout preventer.  By late May, the destroyed well was 
estimated to leak 30,000 to 60,000 barrels of crude oil a day (Reed & Fitzgerald, 2011).   Given 
that if the blowout preventer had properly functioned, the massive leakage from the Deepwater 
Horizon must not have occurred. Therefore, the BP oil spill case can be classified as a 
technological disaster caused by an identifiable malfunction of a remote switch that ultimately 
led to marine pollution in the Gulf of Mexico (Reed & Fitzgerald, 2011).   
 Similarly, the Freedom industries case also illustrates that a technological failure to 
prevent a one-inch hole in the bottom of a storage tank from which hazardous chemicals were 
released into the Elk River ultimately left more than a hundred residents who were damaged 
from contaminated drinking water and experienced related diseases such as nausea, headaches, 
burning skin, rash, etc. (The Washington Post, Jan 10, 2014).  Therefore, the common attribute 
of both cases was what the public could understand and identify the link between the explosion 
of the Deepwater Horizon for BP and the one-inch hole at Freedom Industries and resulting 
massive oil and chemical spills.  According to Hoffman and Ocasio (2001), social salience of an 
event is created when outsiders of an accident industry can attribute direct accountability to the 
industry (i.e., identifiability) or when insiders of the industry can examine an accident as a threat 
to the industry’s image (i.e., damage)  The direct association between  a man-made error and 
environmental and non-environmental damages heightened public attention to an accident firm 
and its industry (Barnett & King, 2008), thus igniting TMTs operating in the same industry to 
perceive the possibility of receiving greater penalty from the public if similar technological 
disasters are repeated, thus damaging its industry image and identity (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001).  
As illustrated in Figure 2, the identifiable causality between a man-made cause and massive 
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damages is the attribute of a technological disaster, distinguishable from the attributes of a 
natural disaster and a sequential disaster. 
 
Figure 2 – Classification of Environmental Disasters by Event    
 
  
 Following previous disaster studies in the crisis management literature (e.g., Richardson, 
1994; Robert, 1990; Weick, 1988), I define a technological disaster as an extensive and low-
probability disruption to stakeholders and the natural environment made by controllable 
organizational and technological failure.  The definition indicates that organizational and 
technological failure (e.g., oil spill occurred by man-made mistake) alone does not fulfill the 
conditions of being classified as a disaster.  Instead, when a technological failure causes 
economic and non-economic damages massive enough to trigger the public attention from 
stakeholders, the catastrophic event is classified as a disaster (Roberts, 1990; Richardson, 1994) 
and is critical to shaping organizational attention to relevant issues (Gavetti et al. 2012; Ocasio, 
2011).  Furthermore, regarding the disruption shown in the definition of a technological disaster, 
this study adopts an operational definition suggested by the Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disaster at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in Belgium.  By definition, an 
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extensive disruption to stakeholders includes at least one of the following criteria: “10 or more 
people are reported killed; 100 or more people are reported affected, injured, and/or homeless; 
the government declares a state of emergency; the government requests international assistance.”   
 With regard to a similar construct, a technological disaster is conceptually different from 
wrongdoing, which is defined as a firm’s behaviors that “place a firm’s stakeholders at risk and 
violates their expectation of societal norms and general standards of conduct” (Zavyalova et al., 
2012: p. 1080).  Industry wrongdoing is related to quality that exists when a firm’s offerings 
meet or exceed stakeholder’s expectation.  When a firm intentionally or unintentionally violates 
customer expectation by providing defective products, wrongdoing happens.  When that 
happens, an accident firm makes compensation to stakeholders in a way of product recall 
(Zavyalova et al., 2012).  Meanwhile, a technological disaster is disruptive and unprecedented so 
that the violation of social contract cannot be applied to an accident firm which may or may not 
have fulfilled stakeholders’ expectations.  When a technological disaster happens, a responsible 
firm ends up transferring damages to stakeholders in a way of social cost.   
Technological Disasters and Environmental Actions 
 As the primary purpose of this study is to explore the mediating effect of TMT attention 
to natural environmental issues in the environmental decision-making process, the first thing to 
be done is to establish a theoretical association between a technological disaster and a firm’s 
environmental action.  That is, if no theoretical relationship exists between a technological 
disaster and a firm’s environmental action, TMT attention has nothing to mediate (Mathieu & 
Taylor, 2006)
1
. 
                                                          
1
 Mathieu & Taylor (2006) distinguish indirect and mediating relationships.  Unlike a mediation relationship, an 
indirect relationship does not necessarily demonstrate the direct effect of an independent variable and a dependent 
variable.  As indirect effect includes a chain of events such that technological disaster affects TMT attention, which, 
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 Research in the environmental management literature has seen a preventive 
environmental action as a firm’s effort to nurture capabilities for environmental competency 
(Hart, 1995; Hart & Dowell, 2011).  The anticipated outcomes of the action include 
organizational efficiency/productivity and increased financial performance.  Meanwhile, a 
protective environmental action mainly seeks environmental legitimacy, which is achieved when 
stakeholders believe that a focal firm’s business objectives and practices at least fulfill their 
expectations (Suchman, 1995).  According to Chattopadhyay, Glick, and Huber (2001), 
organizational actions are made depending on whether managers perceive an event as a threat.  
Specifically speaking, when TMTs perceive events as either a threat to market control or a firm’s 
profitability, they actively take actions to avoid or reduce threats.  Under the circumstances 
where the causes of a technological disasters are readily identified and attributed to a firm, a 
TMT perceives a technological failure that could cause economic and environmental damages as 
a salient threat and ascertains that a firm’s intentional or unintentional involvement would result 
in the loss of firm’s performance and market share (McMullen, Shepherd, & Patzelt, 2009), as 
well as the loss of legitimacy (Deephous & Carter, 2005).  These unrealized threats motivate a 
TMT to seek either internal or external strategic actions, and the choice depends on the type of 
expected losses (Shinkle, 2012).   
 When a TMT perceives a threat to market share of its firm, it tends to take internally-
oriented actions by strengthening the quality, productivity, and efficiency of its products and 
attempts to alleviate control-reducing threats (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001).  To offset negative 
perception of control-reducing threat from the a technological disaster, a TMT enhances 
internally-oriented environmental actions in a way that a firm reduces wastes and defects by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in turn, affects a firm’s environmental action, the direct effect of the disaster on a firm’s action is not prerequisite for 
an indirect effect.      
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integrating environmental management into a manufacturing process.  This environmental action 
increases a firm’s control in a manufacturing process by reducing defects, a competitive 
advantage in a competitive market by increasing productivity and efficiency, and a social 
responsibility in a general environment by stabilizing its organizational operation.   
 Similarly, a TMT can perceive likely-loss threats due to its firm’s involvement in causing 
technological disaster.  The likely-loss threat implies that causing a technological disaster could 
result in losses of customers, reputation, and performances.  According to threat-rigidity 
hypothesis (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Ocasio, 1995), when likely-loss threats are perceived, a 
TMT tends to choose externally-oriented actions to keep its market power from uncertainties.  
To offset the negative perception from the likely-loss threat of a technological disaster, a TMT 
enhances externally-oriented environmental actions in a way that a firm nurtures environmental 
competency and develop environmental stewardship that requires experience and knowledge of 
preventive environmental actions (Hart, 1995).     
 Lastly, a TMT perceives legitimacy-loss threats due to environmental disaster caused by 
technological failure.  Unlike reputation, which is based on a firm’s competency, legitimacy is 
present only when a firm is “meeting and adhering to the expectations of a social system’s norm, 
values, rules, and meanings” (Deephouse and Carter, 2005: p.331).  This indicates that as long as 
a firm abides by desirable and appropriate value in a societal system, it can survive at least by 
getting favorable exchange conditions that delegitimized firms cannot obtain.  A firm seeking 
environmental legitimacy rather than competency tends to exert their efforts to meet minimal 
requirements specified by stakeholders.  This environmental action at least enables the firm to 
avoid being criticized for having been irresponsible for environmental issues when technological 
disaster happens, and the action is referred to as a protective environmental action.           
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Attention-Based View 
 Proposed by Simon (1976) and March and Simon (1958), individual level of attention in 
an organization has been long discussed.  Assuming the bounded rationality of a decision-maker 
constituting three central concepts – satisficing, search, and routinization (Gavetti et al., 2012), 
behavioral theorists focus on how managers set organizational goals and how they behave to 
achieve those goals under uncertainty.  In the behavioral theory of the firm, subjective salience 
plays a critical role in determining the level of organizational goals, and managerial attentions of 
decision-maker are based on the salience (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Shinkle, 2012).   
 As a complementary view to the behavioral theory of the firm, the attention-based view 
assumes an organization as systems of structurally distributed attention in which cognitions and 
actions of individuals are derived from organizational contexts and situations and define 
organization-level attention as “the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and 
effort by organizational decision-makers on both issues … and answers” (Ocasio, 1997; p.189).   
The attention is shaped by a firm’s formal, informal structures, routines, procedures, 
communication channel, as well as organizational goals (Cho & Hambrick, 2006).  The selective 
attention to organizational issues and initiatives leads to decision-making and, ultimately, a 
firm’s competitive advantage (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005).   
 This view enlarges determinants of organizational attention to include social-cognitive 
and structural processes that encode, understand and focus efforts and time on external stimuli in 
different manners (Barreto, 2013; Ocasio, 1997).  This view provides the lens that links events in 
general environments and strategic actions by explaining why organizations selectively pay 
attention to a few events, how organizational contexts create distinguishable internal situations 
 16 
 
that facilitate communication and interactions among TMT managers, and how firms distribute 
that attention in response to external environments (Ocasio, 1997).    
In the attention-based view, external environments are viewed as the source that provides 
an unlimited number of events (Ocasio 2011). Meanwhile firms are characterized by their limited 
ability to identify, understand and process all information from environments (Cyert & March, 
1963).  Thus, firms are assumed to selectively attend to a few events by coordinating structural, 
social, and cognitive processes of attention and adapt to the environment (Levinthal & Rerup, 
2006; Ocasio, 1997; Rerup, 2009).  It indicates that the attention-based view provides an 
alternative perspective of a firm’s action to the theories that emphasize environmental 
determinism, since the action is driven by what issues and answers a TMT focuses its attention 
on, the focus of attention determined by the organizational context in which the firm is situated 
and the governance structure that influences a TMT’s problem framing (Ocasio, 1997; Thomas, 
Clark, & Gioia, 1993).   Ocasio (1997) conceptualizes the view by proposing three principles of 
organization-level attention.   
Three Principles of Organization-Level Attention 
Selective Attention as Manifestation of Individual Cognition 
 Following the assumption of the behavioral theory of the firm, Ocasio (2011) assumes 
that firms cannot equally distribute attention to all possible external events and proposes that 
they selectively attend to a limited number of strong cues and ignore others, the attention referred 
to as selective attention.  The assumption behind the relationship between the presence of 
numerous external stimuli and selective attention is that a TMT, consisting of managers who 
have bounded rationality, focuses its attention on the limited stimuli based on salience (Cyert & 
March, 1963).   It is notable that actual events are not necessarily influence a TMT turn its 
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attention to relevant issues unless a TMT perceives the events as salient (Lampel, Shamsie, & 
Shapira, 2009).  When the event is perceived as salient (Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005), a 
TMT labels and categorizes the event into its routinized cognitive framework through enactment 
in the process of sensemaking (Weick, 1988; Weick & Sutcliff, 2006; Weick, Sutcliff, & 
Obstfeld, 2005).   
 Sensemaking is “the process of social construction that occurs when discrepant cues 
interrupt individual ongoing activities, and involves the retrospective development of plausible 
meanings that rationalize what people are doing” (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; p.551).  When 
organization focuses a problematic situation that is interrupted by an unexpected event, people 
materialize this uncertain situation by giving a meaning and transform it to a problem by labeling 
and categorizing the situation (Weick, 1995), and the problem that was labeled and categorized 
places relevant issues on an agenda to attend to (Lüscher & Lewis, 2008).   
 From the perspective of sensemaking, a disastrous event such as a technological disaster 
is enacted, rather than encountered (Maitlis & Sorenshein, 2010; Weick, 1993).  The term 
enactment describes the process by which people conceptualize an event that was not categorized 
in cognition by setting aside portions of cognitive repertoire and symbolize the conceptualized 
event to reinforce its meaning for further attention (Weick, 1988).  As the result of the enactment 
process, people in an organization have the enacted environment where the symbolized event is 
assigned significance and meaning and is linked to future actions.  Thus, enactment process 
enables people to commonly attend to an event by facilitating individuals to make more sense of 
it through categorization and symbolization (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  Weick (1993) used the 
disaster that 13 U.S. Forest Service Smokejumpers died in the process of extinguishing forest fire 
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in rugged mountain to examine why sensemaking of a highly trained team was collapsed and 
suggested that the emergent situation was not properly noticed and enacted.   
 Enactment is referred to as both a process and a product that are produced as people act 
upon a new threat in routinized activities (Weick, 1988).  The discrepancy between changed 
environments due to a new threat and ongoing activities facilitates enactment that includes the 
activities of constructing, categorizing, and prioritizing a problematic event (Lampel, Shamsie, & 
Shapira, 2009), which are the foundation for the selection of meanings (Gephart, 1993; Weick et 
al., 2005) and for organizational change (Lüscher & Lewis, 2008).  According to Lüscher & 
Lewis (2008), the whole process of sensemaking by which people enact, interpret, and select is 
differentially shaped by organizational identity – who we are, as identity determines what we 
enact, how we understand and interpret, and what we act (Ocasio, 1997).  In sum, a disruptive 
event that provides TMT managers with a salient signal leads a TMT to go through enactment 
process and then to have a selective attention to a few issues that were prioritized through 
enactment.            
Situated Attention as Manifestation of Contextual Influence 
 Secondly, Ocasio (1997) proposes situated attention.  What a TMT focuses on and how it 
behaves is shaped by its external and internal contexts of organizations (Barnett, 2008; Ocasio, 
2011).  According to Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgreen (1990), the impact of signals from an event 
on attention and action of signal recipients varies depending on the situation where the recipient 
and the event are commonly located.  If the situation is supportive of what the event intends to 
imply, the event could draw recipient attention via supportive situations.  For organizations 
influenced by different types of internal and external situations including competitive dynamics 
(Dess and Beard, 1994), absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), slack resources 
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(Greve, 2008), and geographic distance from an event (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000), the intensity 
of situated attention could vary across organizations. 
  The extent to which a TMT focuses its attention on an issue varies depending on the 
contextual determinants such as firm performance (Tuggle et al., 2010) and growth (Greve, 
2008), which play a crucial role in strengthening situated attention by facilitating insiders to 
discuss the situation they are located in (Ocasio, 1997), and the speed at which an industry 
changes (Nardkarni & Barr, 2009).  Nardkarni and Barr suggested that high velocity 
environments lead to attention to competitive and market environments.   Plourde, Parker, and 
Schaan (2013) examine the circumstances where expatriates helps overseas subsidiary to attract 
headquarters’ attention.    The context influences participants in a discussion in concert with the 
symbol of language that represents meaning or substance (Geertz, 1973), and the integration of 
an issue with symbolism facilitates them to categorize it in a communication channel (Gioia et 
al., 1994).    
 The more TMT managers perceive to be situated together, the more they tend to 
intensively share and communicate what they focus time and efforts on, then forming an 
attention emerged from a communication channel (Ocasio, 1997; 2012).  In this process, they 
interact, engage in communication, and influence one another (Ocasio 1997) and tend to have 
homogenous attention to events in the channel.  The emerged, situated attention  is reflected 
through the internal communication channel in which some forms of cognitive schema and 
contexts surrounding an organization interact and elicit participants to experience sensemaking 
processes (Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005) and to determine what individual behave (Cialdini, 
Kallgreen, & Reno, 1991)   In sum, internal and external environments determines the intensity 
of signals from an event that will be shared and discussed in communication channels.  While 
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interacting and communicating among insider, situated attention is emerged from the channel.  
The intensity of situated attention to a specific event and relevant issues could vary according to 
the extent to which signals from an event are relayed.     
Structural Distribution of Attention as Manifestation of Structural Process 
 The third principle is a structural distribution of attention, which suggests that the rules, 
resources, and players of a firm govern social, economic and cultural mechanisms that vary 
across firms (Barnett, 2008; Ocasio, 1997).   The mechanisms distribute and control the channels 
of decision making through which TMT managers interact (Ocasio 1997).  As forms of 
communicative exchange, governance channels shape the attention of decision makers and thus 
lead to change in strategic direction, and the formal channels generate informal channels, and the 
interconnection across formal and informal channels guides strategy formulation (Ocasio & 
Joseph, 2005).   According to the authors, as channels are embedded in organizational social and 
economic structure consists of rules, resources, and people, attentions of TMT managers 
surrounded by governance channels are socially structured and thus focused on selective issues 
enacted by people who allocate rules and resources.     
  A TMT, standing in the middle of the mechanisms, evaluates and legitimizes issues that 
are rushed in from both inside and outside of its organization by being influenced by 
communication channels embedded in those mechanisms (Ren & Guo, 2011).  This attention 
process is closely related to issue selling, which is referred to as “the process by which 
individuals affect others’ attention to and understanding of the events, developments, and trends 
that have implications for organizational performance” (Dutton et al., 2001: p.  716). As interests 
and identities are structured through the network of formal and informal channels, the structures 
of TMT attention is determined by how organizational players control and distribute the 
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allocation of interests and identities.  As a result, the allocation of identities and interest of TMT 
managers is an underlying determinant to their enactment, understanding, and interpreting 
environments and, furthermore, strategic directions. 
 From the perspective of bounded rationality of managers, a TMT relies on logic 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999),  embeddeness in institution (Hung, 2005), structure and structure 
(Kabanoff & Brown, 2008), identity and image (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001), players (Maula, Keil, 
& Zahra, 2013), procedures, rules, resources and processes when it selects issues initiated by 
both inside and outside stakeholders (Dutton et al., 2001).  Thornton and Ocasio (1999) posit that 
an editorial logic as an institutional logic influences executives to focus their attention on author-
editor relationships, whereas market logic influences them to focus more on issues of resource 
competition and organizational growth.  Observing organizational attention of Taiwanese IT 
firms, Hung (2005) found the extent to which firms are embedded in institutional environments 
influence the firm to pay more attention to institutional environment when entering into a new 
market.  Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) posit that public attention is shaped when an event damages 
industrial identity and image.  Kabanoff and Brown (2008) suggest that strategic configuration of 
clusters of strategic elements determines organizational attention. Regarding players, Maula et al. 
(2013) suggest that corporate venture capital leads to TMT attention to technological 
discontinuity.  These examples implies that top-down or schema driven TMT attention that is 
influenced by the individuals or groups who are eligible to distribute routines, procedures, and 
rules by governing resources and processes.  In this process, a TMT dissolves its existing 
problem framing on issues and reframes it to interpret issues and the whole process is based on 
its organizational interests and identities (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Ocasio, 1997).         
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Technological Disasters Affecting TMT Attention:  
Hypotheses Development 
 In the process of framing a TMT’s cognitive framework, managers subjectively prioritize 
issues and answers in accordance with the salience of events (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 
Sutcliff, & Obstfeld, 2005).  Despite their affiliation with the same organization, the degree to 
which  managers view natural environmental issues as salient varies from individual to 
individual before a technological disaster happens.    After a salient event is noticed, TMT 
managers reconstruct homogeneous and consistent cognitive repertoires of categories and make 
more sense of issues relevant to the noticed event (Ocasio, 1997; Weick, 1995).  The more 
disruptive an event is, the more likely a TMT is to enact its environment and adjust a cognitive 
framework with new priorities and implications for future actions (Arrfelt, Wiseman, & Hult, 
2013), rather than to rely on routinized framework (Weick & Sutcliff, 2006).   
 Causing economic, human, and environmental damages and characterized by identifiable 
causality, a technological disaster gives rise to social salience in an accident industry (Hoffman 
& Ocasio, 2001) and facilitates the enactment process of TMT managers (Ocasio, 1997), as the 
disaster  causes crises and “a collective breakdown in sense making” (Pearson & Clair, 1998: p. 
64).  Hoffman & Ocasio (2001) define social salience as “the prominence or importance of a 
stimulus to a particular context” (p.429).  The attribution of accountability and the pressures 
from insiders and outsiders of an affiliated industry who condemn an accident firm create social 
salience that serves as an implicit rule that possibly regulates the firms operating in the same 
industry with an accident firm (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Zavyalova et al., 2012).    
 When a salient event is noticed, organizations, at least, “consider the type of request 
being made and the type of problem being faced… and what role they are playing in a particular 
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context” (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006: p. 507) and encode issues ingenerated by a technological 
disaster into cognitive repertoire of categories.  When existing routinized processes and ongoing 
activities cannot effectively address the situation caused by the occurrence of a technological 
disaster, decision-makers go through mindful enactment (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006).  According 
to Weick, Sutcliff, and Obstfeld (2005), categorizing and labeling the problematic situation 
enables managers to be more oriented and closer to possible signals created by an event for close 
attention and deploy cognitive repertoire of categories that is amenable to functional activities.  
Therefore, a sensemaking process triggered by a technological disaster has a TMT differentiate a 
natural environment segment from other segments and materializes a problematic situation as an 
issue.   
 I suggest that the salience of a technological disaster elicits TMTs who work in the same 
industry where a technological disaster occurs to go through enactment process by which issues 
that are relevant to technological disasters are prioritized and focused in accordance with the 
salience (Weick, 1995).  By definition, a technological disaster means an extensive and low-
probability disruption to the natural environment and stakeholders, leaving environmental and 
economic damages.  In a narrow sense, environmental issues include only problematic situations 
surrounding business classified by Anderson and Bateman (2002) such as air pollution, solid 
waste disposal, topsoil erosion, ozone depletion, pollution growth, marine and fresh water 
pollution, toxic waste accumulation and disposal, reduction in biodiversity, wetland destruction, 
deforestation, and climate modification.  Meanwhile, drawing on the definition of Ocaiso’s 
(1997) organizational attention could enlarge the range of natural environmental issues by 
including the answers to corresponding environmental problematic situation such as proprietary 
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environmental programs and technologies, business practices of treating wastes, environmental 
regulations, and so on. 
 As a central entity of triggering technological disasters, organizations have been 
criticized for transferring social costs to the natural environment and experienced negative 
spillover that happens when a firm do harm to the reputation intertwined with other firms in the 
same industry (Barnett & King, 2008; Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008).  Furthermore, the negative 
spillover effect is more intensified, as outsiders of an industry tend to ambiguously categorize 
and attribute the damages of an accident to an industry as a whole (Zavyalova et al., 2012).   
 Given that an issue is “a development, event, or trend perceived as potentially having an 
impact on the organization” (Bansal, 2003: p.511) and organization’s problems and opportunities 
(Ocasio & Joseph, 2005), the occurrence of a technological disaster could lead other firms 
operating in the same industry to attend to the issues that are adversely affected by a 
technological disaster as a negative, potential impact on organizations through stakeholders 
(Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010).  Therefore, salience of a technological 
disaster leads a TMT to focus time and efforts on natural environmental issues.  Therefore,   
Hypothesis 1: Technological disaster is positively associated with TMT attention to 
natural environmental issues 
 
A Contingency Framework of TMT Attention to Natural Environmental Issues 
Corporate Governance 
 The underlying concept of a structural distribution of attention is how a TMT attends to 
depends on how the organization distributes and controls the allocation of communications and 
procedures (Ocasio, 1997).  The distribution of communication channel structured by 
organizational rules, resources, and players shapes TMT attention to issues (Barnett, 2008; 
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Ocasio, 1997).   According to Ocasio (1997), the structure of attention facilitates TMT managers 
to go through the enactment of the environment by structurally distributing interests and 
identities of TMT managers (Ocasio, 1997).  It suggests that TMTs vary in the extent that they 
attended to an issue, and the degree of TMT attention to an issue is determined by attentional 
structure, and the structure shapes a problem framing of TMT managers by distributing and 
controlling the allocation of communication channel along with personal identities and interests 
of TMT managers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Ocasio, 1997).     
 Corporate governance including influences of a founder’s family and controlling 
shareholders, composition of directors, and effective controls of CEO renders some events more 
salient to TMT managers.  The salience, in turn, serves as an implicit rule within an organization 
that enforces TMT managers to be more attentive to related issues and answers (Hoffman & 
Ocasio, 2001).  When TMT managers perceive threats from a technological disaster as greater 
due to its organizational governance, they enact their own cognitive framework and reprioritize 
relevant issues to the disaster in  response to an low-probability and sudden disruptive threat 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Weick & Sutcliff, 2006).   
  Throughout the process by which a TMT notices a technological disaster and focuses its 
attention on natural environmental issues, a firm-specific structural distribution of attention 
formed by governance characteristics substantially influences TMT managers to build a negative 
problem framing on technological disasters and to be highly sensitive to technological disasters.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a TMT has different level of attention to natural 
environmental issues depending on corporate governance.  I propose that ownership dispersal, 
family influence, outside directors, and non CEO duality build a negative problem prospect on a 
technological threat, thus eliciting a TMT to be more attentive to natural environmental issues.   
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Ownership Concentration 
 Ownership concentration refers to the extent to which outstanding shares are 
concentrated in the hands of blockholders who can effectively monitor management and affect 
the overall direction of strategy (Dam & Scholtens, 2013).  High ownership concentration that 
effectively eliminates information asymmetry between shareholders and management was found 
to discourage the agency behaviors of managers who could otherwise prioritize their personal 
interests over a firm’s interest by monitoring management (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  For another 
attribute, controlling shareholders own significant amount of equity positions in their invested 
firms, which constrains them from flexibly disposing their equity positions at the desirable price.   
 Alternatively, they tend to tolerate short-term unprofitability as long as long-term payouts 
are expected.  When controlling shareholders as a provider of a valuable resource identify 
strategic decisions of invested firms is conflicting to their long-term investment intention, they 
increase stakeholder salience to a TMT and influence a direction of managerial decision by 
exercising their powerful, legitimate, and urgent claims (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) rather 
than withdrawing their ownership positions from the firm.  A TMT under controlling 
shareholders or blockholders holding a majority of ownership may have a negative problem 
framing on a technological disaster and attend it as adversely affecting long-term performances.  
Therefore, when ownership is highly concentrated to blockholders, a TMT is more likely to 
facilitate enactment by which natural environmental issues are prioritized (Weick, 1995). 
Hypothesis 2: Ownership concentration will positively moderate the technological 
disaster and TMT attention relationship.    
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Outside Director 
 The primary role of the board of directors is to effectively fulfill their control over and 
service tasks for management, which includes offering advice and counsel to a TMT (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999).  I suggest these two roles have a significant implication for TMT attention to 
natural environmental issues.  Inside directors are identified as being dependent of a TMT due to 
an inconvenient position to monitor TMT performance regularly, a loyalty they have long 
exhibited to TMT managers, and possible losses of personal interest (Johnson, Daily, and 
Ellstrand, 1996).  For outside directors, however, their independence makes it possible to freely 
suggest adjusting strategic orientations and to propose alternatives to the existing policies 
maintained by a TMT (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  This indicates that the more outside directors 
engage in the governance, the more diversified interests, perspective, and professional 
knowledge are (Johnson & Greening, 1999).   
 The presence of outside directors who bring in various perspectives and knowledge 
increase the possibility that a firm notices and encodes possible threats that had been 
unrecognized before outside directors were present in the board.  Further, it gives more weights 
to managing threats that are ultimately directed to stakeholders who have a wide range of the 
needs (Johnson et al., 1996).  For a TMT whose decisions and performances are monitored and 
influenced by outside directors, its internally oriented attention to pursue self-interests is 
discouraged, while its externally oriented attention tends to be encouraged due to a established 
problem frame that encodes and interprets environmental concerns as salient to be able to 
adversely affect the relationship with stakeholders and to result in deteriorated quality of 
environments (Walls et al., 2012).  A TMT under outside directors evaluates a technological 
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disaster as a risk that adversely affects its interests and identities and is more likely to facilitate 
enactment by which natural environmental issues are prioritized. 
Hypothesis 3: Outside directors will positively moderate the technological disaster and 
TMT attention relationship. 
CEO Duality 
 CEO duality is referred to as the situation where “the same person holds the titles of CEO 
and chairperson of the board of directors in a corporation” (Tuggle et al., 2010: p. 951).  This 
situation reduces monitoring of board of directors (BOD) toward management by engaging in 
both management and control (Tuggle et al., 2010).  Lowering the intensity of BOD monitoring 
over managerial decisions through the duality, CEO can take actions opposed to shareholders’ 
interests by taking advantage of his/her enhanced discretion (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).  
Since CEO is internally oriented and focuses on the performances that could improve its 
compensation (Mallette & Fowler, 1992), it possibly promotes CEO entrenchment that occurs 
when CEO is so powerful as to earn more personal interests by compromising on shareholders’ 
interest (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). 
 A CEO who is internally focused due to duality tends to seek, for instance, unrelated 
diversification strategy to reduce his/her employment risk by sacrificing the interests of 
shareholders (Hoskinsson & Hitt, 1990).  CEO’s individual motivation to lower employment 
ends up with leaving risks to shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001).  In 
the same logic, CEO reduces the attention to external environments and becomes more attentive 
to internal environments such as entrenchment (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994).  This indicates 
that a TMT under the CEO duality evaluates a technological disaster as a risk that would not 
harm its interests and identities and is less likely to facilitate enactment by which natural 
environmental issues are prioritized. 
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Hypothesis 4: CEO duality will negatively moderate the technological disaster and TMT 
attention relationships. 
 
Family Influence 
 Aiming at inter-generational succession, family firms tend to maintain family identity and 
influence in an organization for a long-term period time.  The family goal induces a firm to 
allocate more efforts and resources to managing its social reputation and the ties with 
stakeholders (Duh, Belak, & Milfelner, 2010) and to adopt policies that demands a long-term 
commitment (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  Although the policies need substantial capital 
investment that reduces financial slacks (Hart & Ahuja, 1996) and undermines a short-term 
profitability (Chrisman, Mernili, & Misra, 2013), family firms often assume the risks, as they 
believe environmentally irresponsible actions could adversely affect family affective wealth such 
as the loss of family influence that could discontinue their long-term succession planning 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
 Family influence increases commitment (Zahra et al., 2008) and empowerment 
(Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger, 2012), thus enabling managers to consider taking more 
risks for affective needs of families (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  Hernandez (2012) proposes that 
the effect of family influence on managers’ cognitive process is enhanced when a mental model 
for family value is shared between managers and families.  This is, the mental model promotes 
managers to act for and think like owners by prioritizing family affective needs.  Similarly, a 
TMT under family influence will have a negatively framed perspective on the possibility of 
being involved in a technological disaster, which will harm the reputation of a founder’s family.  
Therefore, TMT under family influence evaluates a technological disaster as a risk that adversely 
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affects its interests and identities and is more likely to facilitate enactment by which natural 
environmental issues are prioritized. 
Hypothesis 5: Family influence will positively moderate the technological disaster and 
TMT attention relationship.    
 
Vicarious Learning 
 The underlying concept of situated attention is what a TMT focuses on and behaves 
depends on the particular context its organization is located in (Ocasio, 1997).  As TMT 
managers affiliated with an organization are exposed to the same environments, within-group 
variance in selective attention is smaller than between-group variance.  It indicates that an 
organizational cognitive framework has been built through social cognitive process (Levinthal & 
Rerup, 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006) by which individual cognitive frameworks influence one 
another among TMT managers.  This process is referred to as situated cognition (Elsbach, Barr, 
& Hargadon, 2005). 
 Similarly, attentions of individual TMT managers are shared in the decision-making 
process and the focusing of attention emerges from the social interaction among TMT members 
who participate in communication channel (Ocasio, 1997).    The emergent attention in the 
communication channel is referred to as situated attention (Ocasio, 1997; Schilling et al., 2003), 
which is the product of communication through which TMT managers share and discuss what 
they noticed and interpreted about the situation that organization is located in.  The situated 
attention is stronger when TMT managers can make temporal (i.e., frequency) and spatial (i.e., 
scope) commitment to communication (Ocasio, 1997).  Therefore, the context that could 
motivate them to actively participate in communication channels will moderate the impact of a 
technological disaster on TMT attention to natural environmental issues.   
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 Given that a disaster triggers uncertainties (Pearson & Clair, 1998), firms are motivated 
to learn other firms’ environmental practices and strategies to reduce uncertainties, thus 
facilitating situated attention to natural environmental issues in a way that communication among 
TMT managers is more frequent and intensive.   This is, it is notable that organizational 
characteristics such as performance relative to aspiration level (Greve, 2003), a firm’s ability to 
absorb external knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and similarity to an accident firm (Baum 
et al., 2000) increase the likelihood that TMT managers are motivated to learn environmental 
strategies and practices from others.   
 Vicarious learning is distinguishable from experiential learning that firms obtain 
knowledge by doing something new (Huber, 1991).  Vicarious learning is referred to as “an 
attempt to learn the strategies, management practices, and especially technologies possessed by 
other organizations” (Tsang, 2002: p. 836).  According to Tsang (2002), the attempt to learn 
from others increases as managers highly perceive the needs for the knowledge and are exposed 
to more information than they immediately need.  Thus, I propose that organizational conditions 
under which TMT managers are broadly exposed to and feel more needs for knowledge related 
to a technological disaster enhances situated attention to natural environmental issues.    
Geographic Similarity to an Accident Firm 
 Disasters increase uncertainties to firms (Weick, 1988).  When firms identify highly 
uncertain events, they tend to imitate the actions of other firms having similar organizational 
characteristics to reduce uncertainties (Gentry, Dalziel, & Jamison, 2013; Peng, Tan, & Tong, 
2004).  As technological disasters that are characterized by low-probability and sudden 
disruptions to external environments create uncertainties, firms relying on limited experiences 
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and knowledge observe how other firms operating in the same industry address the consequences 
to reduce uncertainties and acquire new knowledge (Baum et al., 2000).   
 Following the logic above, when the accident firm has similar characteristics to those of a 
focal firm, the focal firm will make more sense of a technological disaster and intensively focus 
its attention on possible spillover effect that would adversely affect itself due to geographical 
similarity.  Geographic similarity is referred to as the extent to which a focal firm is proximately 
located with other firms (Lee & Pennings, 2002).  Geographic similarity is characterized by the 
situation where clienteles are commonly shared and firms directly and symbolically interact one 
another (Lee & Pennings, 2002).  Furthermore, the similarity provides a crucial reference that a 
TMT socially compares its capabilities of addressing threats in a similar context to, and the 
intensity of learning by observing others firms’ actions against an event increases organizational 
attention (Greve, 2003).   As a result, high degree of geographical similarity increases the 
likelihood that a firm observes and learns from mistakes of an accident firm (Csaszar & 
Siggelkow, 2010).  
 More specifically, motivation of a focal firm to vicariously learn and attention to the 
relevant issues are stronger when information on the firm is observable and relevant so that a 
focal firm could compare and infer possible scenario (Greve, 1998).  It is reasonable to anticipate 
that firms have similar strategic profile such as the location proximity of a focal firm and an 
accident firm (Baum et al.  2000).  In the context, TMT managers are more motivated to actively 
communicate one another to share what they attended to and to predict the possibility that its 
firm is involved in causing a technological disaster.  The increased communication and 
interactions will create higher TMT attention to natural environmental issues in the 
communication channel. 
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Hypothesis 6: Similarity to an accident firm will positively moderate the technological 
disaster and TMT attention relationship. 
Absorptive Capacity 
 Zahra and George (2002) define absorptive capacity as a dynamic capability to acquire, 
assimilate, and apply knowledge in external environments.  The capacity has been identified as a 
critical property of a receiver who is better able to receive knowledge (Csaszar & Siggelkow, 
2010; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  When absorptive capacity is high, firms are better able to 
understand external environments, transform what they understand into knowledge, and increase 
commercial outputs, thus contributing to a firm’s performance in a highly uncertain industry.   
 According to Lane, Koka, and Pathak (2006), insiders’ mental model and knowledge 
making process is a major predictor of absorptive capacity.  The author posits that insiders share 
a mental model by influencing one another in the process by which knowledge is actively 
transferred, shared, integrated, and created.  In other words, a higher level of absorptive capacity 
enables firms to readily note and understand the occurrence of a technological disaster and to 
effectively share and integrate what they learned from the environments through transferring 
tacit knowledge and experiences across business units of a firm (Baum & Ingram, 1998), 
facilitating situated attention to natural environmental issues in the decision making process.  
Therefore, the perceived impact of a technological disaster on TMT attention to natural 
environmental issues is amplified when absorptive capacity facilitates received knowledge to be 
transferred across business units within a firm. 
Hypothesis 7: Absorptive capacity will positively moderate the technological disaster and 
TMT attention relationship. 
Aspiration Level 
 The primary goal of a firm is to create and sustain its profits and maintain its 
attractiveness relative to aspiration level (Greve, 2008).  Aspiration is referred to as 
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organizational goals that create strategic change and risk taking (Shinkle, 2012).   When firms 
achieve a higher performance that exceeds a given goal, a TMT will find slacks resources are 
available and support slack-driven distant search for non-core activities assuming risks (Baum & 
Dahlin, 2007; Levinthal & March, 1981; Ren & Gou, 2011).  Meanwhile, the failure to achieve 
the aspiration leads a TMT to seek a problemistic search for the solution to the lower 
performance relative to aspiration level (Greve, 2008) by focusing the specific problem.   
 During the process of strategic change, a TMT has been found to shape its selective 
attention by both examining a firm’s historic performances and comparing competitors’ current 
performance (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012) and, when a firm’s profitability is above its 
aspiration level, to shift its attention from survival-necessitated performances (e.g., profitability) 
to growth-oriented practices (e.g., organizational size) particularly (Greve, 2008).    Therefore, a 
high performance above aspiration level enables a TMT to communicate with a broad range of 
insiders about growth-oriented environmental practices and strategies away from the issues on 
performance and profitability, and thus increase situated attention to natural environmental 
issues.    
Hypothesis 8: Performance above aspiration will positively moderate the technological 
disaster and TMT attention relationship. 
 
Attention as a Limited Resource 
 Attention is a valuable but limited resource within organizations (Laursen & Salter, 2006; 
Rerup, 2009).  Given that TMT attention is made after managers go through social-cognitive and 
structural processes, the attention is an intangible resource that remains following competition 
among issues in the firm’s decision-making channels (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005).   As a limited 
resource, TMT attention has been identified as fundamental to the exploration of environmental 
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opportunities and active reactions against environmental threats (Hart & Dowell, 2011).  It 
indicates that managers assume risks and allocate resources to the extent that they believe the 
presence of opportunities to explore and of threats to neutralize (King & Lenox, 2002). 
   In early studies, Daft and Weick (1984) posit that a firm’s strategic action depends on 
how managers notice the existence of opportunities and threats and interpret their impacts on 
their organization.  This logic explains why some firms respond to radical changes such as a 
technological disaster or deregulation (Cho & Hambrick, 2006)  in environmental actions while a 
majority of firms do not in a highly uncertain and complicated context where a huge amount of 
information is created but equivocal (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Kaplan, 2008). 
         Following previous studies, I suggest the allocation of resources and efforts into 
environmental actions for the purposes of achieving legitimacy and competency depends on the 
extent to which a TMT is concerned about and confident in natural environmental issues.   The 
more TMT is attentive to the natural environmental issues, the better it is able to understand, 
interpret, and perceive the issues as threats that a firm can neutralize by maintaining 
controllability over environmental issues (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Sharma, 2000).  A high 
level of TMT attention to environmental issues is complete when managers are structurally 
encouraged to pursue natural environmental issues and actively involved in sharing and learning 
one another in the communication channel.  At the moment, the TMT attention has ability to 
control information to flow into a few selective directions and the controllability of information 
flow leads to an organizational movement (Ocasio, 1997). 
 As an organization movement, a TMT will illustrate its attention in different ways to 
neutralize the threats from a technological disaster.  In this study, I theorize and examine a 
preventive environmental action and a protective environmental action as the manifestation of 
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TMT attention to environmental issues.  For the preventive action, a TMT focuses on engaging 
in developing an environmental competency by controlling information flow (Bansal, 2003; 
King & Lenox, 2002).  For the protective action, TMT focuses on achieving or maintaining 
environmental legitimacy by relying environmental expertise of the third party (Russo & Fouts, 
1997).     
TMT Attention to the Natural Environment and Environmental Competency 
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) define a preventive environmental action as an organizational 
effort to “minimize or eliminate the creation of toxic chemical agents during the various stages 
of production” (2009: p.106).  When a TMT perceives an external event as a threat to its 
competitiveness and profitability, the firm is more motivated to choose a preventive action, in 
spite of its necessary risks of investment and required long-term TMT commitment (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). 
 Highly attentive TMT to environmental issues has been found to better identify 
expectations from stakeholders and try to actively figure out what they expect by leveraging 
cumulative tacit knowledge and experience of eliminating pollutants during the various stages of 
production (Hart, 1995; Hart & Dowell, 2011; Nardkani & Hermann, 2010).  It means that high 
attention to environmental issues helps TMT focus its attention on relevant initiatives proposed 
by middle managers (Dutton et al., 2001) and stakeholders (Bansal, 2003).  In the process of 
focusing TMT attention to natural environmental issues, firms are better able to accumulate and 
develop tacit knowledge and experiences as unique advantages and consider preventive 
environmental actions that controls and eliminates pollutants of toxic chemicals and wastes that 
exist anywhere in the whole stages of production (Russo & Fouts, 1997).  Furthermore, adopting 
the preventive environmental actions encourage a TMT to rethink and redesign the whole 
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process to actively fight against loss-likely threats and have stakeholders choose their products in 
both economic and environmentally responsible dimensions (Hart, 1995; Freeman, 1994).   
Hart (1995) highlights a preventive environmental action as the function of making 
organizations environmentally competent and enabling them to accumulate knowledge and 
information through close relationship with stakeholders (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009).  High 
attention to environmental issues that encourages a TMT to have a faith in the presence of a 
firm’s controllability in the natural environment is a determinant for adopting a preventive 
environmental action in response to threats accompanied with the occurrence of a technological 
disaster.  
Hypothesis 9: TMT attention to natural environmental issues is positively associated with 
preventive action 
TMT Attention to the Natural Environment and Environmental Legitimacy 
 Following King & Lenox (2002) and Berrone & Gomez-Mejia (2009), I define a 
protective environmental action as organization efforts to treat, recover, and transfer waste at the 
end of a manufacturing process by complying with environmental regulations and expectations 
enacted by stakeholders.  Unlike the preventive environmental action that aims to eliminate 
causes of environmental degradation or pollutants throughout the entire manufacturing process, a 
protective environmental action focuses on gaining and maintaining environmental legitimacy at 
a lower cost by outsourcing environmental protection activities to an independent, professional 
firm having an environmental expertise (Christmann, 2000; Deephouse & Carter, 2005).  
Adopting a protective environmental action enables firms to have favorable exchange conditions 
with stakeholders, as they can gain at least environmental legitimacy (Desai, 2008).    
 However, the underlying problem of the protective environmental action is that as firms 
rely on the 3
rd
 party’s environmental competency to address environmental concerns, the reliance 
 38 
 
eliminates any opportunity to accumulate knowledge (Hart, 1995) and, thus, to develop natural 
environmental competency (Russo & Foute, 1997).  The primary motivation to adopt this action 
was based on rational and economic decision, but it is worthwhile noting that the cost of 
maintaining environmental legitimacy may exceed the benefit from favorable exchange 
conditions, as a manufacturing process becomes more specific to the 3
rd
 party’s environmental 
competency that should be necessary when manufacturing lines are updated and redesigned 
(Hart, 1995)    
 A TMT having high attention to environmental issues  perceives them as threats to avoid 
and thus seeks an economic way of having their firms look accountable for the natural 
environment at relatively lower costs and risks than a preventive action (Barreto, 2013) and thus 
to focus on the result, rather than process, of environmental actions.  This protective 
environmental action tends to focus on the waste amount that a firm would transfer and recycle 
at the end of production lines (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Russo & Fouts, 1997), instead of 
removing pollutants in the entire manufacturing process.  Therefore, adopting the actions release 
a firm from the concerns that the lack of environmental legitimacy could lead stakeholders to 
ascribe damages of a technological disaster at least partially to a focal firm when a technological 
disaster occurs.   In sum, higher TMT attention leads to employing a protective environmental 
action with which firms can fulfill regulative institutions and stakeholders’ expectations and 
environmental legitimacy.   
Hypothesis 10: TMT attention to natural environmental issues is positively associated 
with protective actions. 
 Attention is an underlying mediating process in the strategy literature (Cho & Hambrick, 
2006; Ocasio, 1997).  In this study, TMT attention to natural environmental issues is the 
manifestation of extended concerns about a technological disaster and the conviction of needs for 
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environmental actions against threats from technological disasters.  In the whole environmental 
decision-making process, TMT attention plays a critical role in noticing, interpreting, and 
selecting initiatives proposed from inside and outside of an organization (Ren & Guo, 2011) and 
enables an organization to accumulate knowledge fundamental to developing environmental 
actions and, more importantly, to champion organization-wide actions for uncertain capital 
investments (Andersson & Bateman, 2000).  Thus, how much firms engage in environmental 
actions depends on the concerns that a TMT attends to as issues (Bansal, 2003) and the 
convictions that it has as answers (Ocasio, 1997). 
Hypothesis 11: TMT attention will mediate the effect of technological disaster on an 
environmental action. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Sample and Data 
 
 In this study, I offer a contingent model that describes how corporate governance and 
motivation to observe and learn about other firm’s failure differentially affects the decision-
making process for environmental actions.  To test the conditional process by which a cognitive 
process that causally links a technological disaster and a firm’s environmental actions, the 
boundary conditions of the causality should be considered simultaneously (Hayes, 2013).  For 
testing these relationships, I chose industries where natural environmental issues were salient and 
secondary quantitative and qualitative data were publicly available.   
 Through reviewing the literature on organizations and the natural environment, I 
identified five industries that have been historically noted as heavy polluters because they 
generate a substantial amount of wastes and chemical substances in the manufacturing process.  
According to Reid and Toffel (2009), the firms that are affiliated with heavily polluting 
industries have long been challenged by environmental activist groups and governmental 
regulations.  Those challenges have led the firms to be better able to capture the signals 
regarding their potential conflicts with environmental demands than firms in other industries.   
 Following Nadkani and Barr (2008)’s two-step process, I narrowed my investigation to 
five industries.  First, based on Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT, 2008) provided by the 
Center for Research on the Epidemiology by Disaster at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in 
Belgium, I examined all industries that experienced a technological disaster at least once in a 10-
 41 
 
year research window from 1994 to 2003.  The industries were collected in the basis of a 2-digit 
SIC and a 3-digit NASIC codes.  For a 2-digit SIC code, 19 industries
2
 experienced a 
technological disaster at least once during the study period, while, for a 3-digit SIC code, 53 
industries went through any technological disaster. 
 Second, to narrow my research focus to methodologically and theoretically relevant 
industries, I reviewed existing literature on environmental actions and performances (e.g., Bansal 
& Clellend, 2004; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Christmann, 2000; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001; 
Walls et al., 2012).  Among 19 SIC-classified industries filtered through the first process,  I 
could reach the five industries that have been commonly addressed as heavy polluters that 
include pulp/paper and plastic manufacturing (NASIC 322, 326 or SIC 26), chemicals & 
iron/steel manufacturing (NASIC 325, 331 or SIC 28), petroleum (NASIC 324 or SIC 29), metal 
parts, semiconductor, machinery, automobile, ship, and aircraft manufacturing (NASIC 332, 333, 
336 or SIC 37), and electric, gas and sanitary services (NASIC 221 or SIC 49) industries.   
 For SIC 28 (chemicals & iron/steel manufacturing), the scope of business characteristics 
are relatively broader than other industries in terms of the number of distinguishable SIC codes.  
Using the 4-digit SIC code for the sample firm’s primary business (Table 1), I classified them 
into the businesses producing chemicals as a primary product and those processing chemicals to 
produce their products (e.g., pharmaceutical preparation, medical equipment, toilet and soap). 
 
                                                          
2
 The industries either directly or indirectly influenced by one or more technological disasters in an 10-year 
observational period are as follows; 
SIC 12 (Coal surface or underground mining), 13 (Crude petroleum, natural gas, and oil exploration), 15 
(Residential and industrial construction), 20 (Food and beverage processing), 22 (Fabric/knitting mills and textile 
goods), 26 (Pulp/paper products), 28 (Chemicals, plastics materials, synthetic rubber, paints and allied products, 
fertilizers, explosives),  29 (Petroleum refining, asphalt paving materials, Oils/Greases), 37(Motor, aircraft, & 
railroad manufacturing and transportation equipment) 40 (Railroads operating), 41 (Local passenger land 
transportation), 44 (Water transportation), 45 (Air transportation), 49 (Electric/natural gas services & utilities), 50 
(Auto parts & industrial equipment), 51 (Stationery and drugs), 56 (Clothing and apparel stores), 59 (Retailers), 
79(Entertainment) 
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Table 1 
Classifying SIC-28 Sample Firms into Subgroups 
Firms producing chemicals as a primary business 
Segment (SIC) Firms 
Plastic Preparation (2821) Rohm & Haas, Eastman Chemical, Dow Chemical 
Biological Chemicals (2879) Monsanto, Amgen 
Alkalies and Chlorine (2812) FMC, Olin 
Industrial Inorganic Chemical (2819) Du Pont (Shifted from SIC 29 in 1999) 
Industrial Chemical (2819; 2869; 2813) Praxair, International Flavors & Fragra, Air Product 
Paint (2851) PPG Industries, Akzo Nobel, Ferro 
 
 
Firms treating chemical to produce primary products 
Segment (SIC) Firms 
Pharmaceutical Preparations (2834)  J & J, Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Pfizer, Schuring-
Plough, Lilly (Eli), Abbott Laboratories, Baxter 
International  
Toilet and Soap (2844) Avon Products, Estee Lauder Cos, Colgate-Palmolive  
 
 
 This study uses quantitative and qualitative data collected from a variety of secondary 
sources, including TRI (Toxic Release Inventory) database released and administrated by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency, a sample firm’s annual reports that provide letters to 
shareholders (LTSs), Compact Disclosure, proxy statement posted on the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and COMPUSTAT.  Having had to use multiple databases, I also 
considered the availability of databases a critical factor in selecting the industries to examine for 
this study.   For example, transportation industries including SIC 40 (railroad transportation), 
SIC 41 (bus & truck transportation), 44 (water transportation), and 45 (air transportation) caused 
the most technological disasters during the observation period due to oil and chemical spills from 
various collisions and mid-air crashes. Several examples include derailment of union pacific 
railroad train on May 27, 2000, crash of Comair Flight 3272 on January 9, 1997 due to 
inadequate standards for icing operations while in flight, and train collision near an Avondale 
Mills plant in Graniteville on January 6, 2005.   In spite of a great number of technical disasters 
in the transportation industries, they have not been required to report their environmental 
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performance to the EPA.  These EPA-reporting exemptions made it impossible to measure their 
environmental actions in my study.  
  Instead, I investigated all cases to find out whether the transportation accidents were 
closely related to supply chains of other EPA-reporting firms in the heavily polluting industries 
and reclassified the accidents into the corresponding industries, if related.  For instance, the case 
where a train collision occurred in the supply chain process of a petrochemical firm was retained 
as a sample case for this study.  Through this process, I identified five transportation accidents 
that were incurred in the process of supply chain for chemical manufacturers and reclassified 
those cases into corresponding industries: chlorine exposure from collided trains in 2005, 
hazardous materials exposed from a derailed train in 2000, sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide 
spilled from a derailed train in 1998, sodium hydroxide spilled from a derailed train in 1998, and 
gas leak from a derailed train in 1996. 
Time Frame and Sample Firm Selection 
 As I aimed to test for the relationships between an event and attention and between 
attention and action, endogeneity issues might arise from the fact that a firm’s environmental 
action could motivate a TMT to be more attentive to natural environmental issues and 
furthermore high TMT attention might reduce the possibility that technological disasters occur in 
an industry.  This reversed causality is possible unless a cause is manipulated to precede its 
effect (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).    
 For a hypothesized causality to remain valid, I aligned a technological disaster, TMT 
attention, and a firm’s environmental actions in chronological order.  As described in Table 2, 
the independent variable, a technological disaster lagged the dependent variable, environmental 
actions, by one year.  For moderating and control variables, I used the same year data with an 
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independent variable.  Specifically, the beginning year of an independent variable, technological 
disaster, was March 1994 through February 1995 before shareholder’s letters were published in 
annual report around March to May 1995.  For a dependent variable, a firm’s environmental 
action, the beginning year was 1995.  It is notable that there is a two-year time lag in the release 
of TRI data, so the data release in 1997 is for a firm’s environmental performance of year 1995 
(Lee, 2000).  By using the secondary data on technological disasters that happened from March 
1994 to Feb 1995, letters to shareholder published from March to May 1995, and Toxic Release 
Inventory reported in 1997, I focused on designing this research to clarify a temporal causality.  
With this research design, I again collected data for a 10-year observational window, and the last 
year of IV was March 2003 to Feb 2004.  To measure a firm’s environmental actions for year 
2004, I used the TRI database of 2006.     
 
Table 2 
Databases and Time Period of Study 
 
 Technological 
Event 
TMT 
Attention  
Environmental 
Action 
Vicarious 
Learning 
Corporate 
Governance 
Industry 
Conditions 
Period 1994-2003 1995-2004 1995-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 
Data 
Source 
EMDAT 
COMPACT 
DISCLOSURE 
TRI COMPUSTAT 
COMPACT 
DISCLOSURE 
COMPUSTAT 
Variables Independent Mediator Dependent Moderator Moderator Control 
 
 Given that prior works in the environmental management literature have examined their 
sample’s environmental performance and actions for 4 to 7 years (e.g., Bansal & Clellend, 2004; 
Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Berrone et al, 2013), I assume that 10-year period of observation 
is a sufficient number of period to reflect the other possible events than technological disaster 
that potentially affect TMT attention for both the firms influenced by a technological disaster and 
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those not influenced (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010) as well as to test for serial correlation (Arellano 
& Bond, 1991). 
 Initially, I selected 15 firms in each of the five industries on the basis of sales in a fiscal 
year of 1995, which is the beginning year of DV.  However, the numbers were adjusted based on 
the availability of database.  Some firms which were publicly traded in the US stock market but 
did not reach a minimum TRI-reporting threshold
3
 were not required to disclose toxic emissions, 
and I dropped the firms who did not report the annual toxic emissions for the reason.  Appendix 
B lists the sample firms and provides basic demographics on each.  I have constructed an 
unbalanced panel comprising 99 firms: 17 firms in SIC 26 (Paper/Pulp manufacturing), 25 firms 
in SIC 28 (Chemicals), 16 firms in SIC 29 (Oil & Gas), 24 firms in SIC 37 (Transportation 
manufacturing), and 17 firms in SIC 49 (Utilities).  As shown in Appendix B, I have 970 
observations.   
Measurements 
Dependent Variables 
 Following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), I classified environmental performance into 
a preventive environmental action that contributes to a firm’s unique advantage and a protective 
environmental action that focuses on complying with regulative and normative pressures for 
environmental legitimacy (Hart, 1995).  Targeting at eliminating underlying sources of 
environmental pollutions existing in the manufacturing process, a preventive environmental 
action were operationalized by the difference in generated hazardous chemicals and wastes 
between a prior and current year.  Meanwhile, a protective environmental action was measured 
by released chemicals that were recycled, treated, or transferred to other sites.    
                                                          
3
 Individual facilities are required to disclose their annual toxic emissions to EPA when they have 10 or more full-
time employees and emit any listed toxic substances in excess of the minimum level (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 
2009) 
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 Preventive Environmental Action Following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), Sarkis 
and Cordeiro (2001) and Hart (1995), I define a preventive environmental action as a firm’s 
effort to eliminates pollutants of hazardous chemicals and wastes that will cause environmental 
concerns by coordinating a manufacturing process with environmental management.  The 
environmental preventive action necessitates the understanding of an underlying mechanism 
whereby polluting factors such as toxic chemicals and wastes are generated and thus needs 
capabilities of process management as well as the nature-environment-related knowledge (Hart, 
1995).  Prior studies measured preventive environmental action by summing up annual emissions 
of chemicals reported to EPA and dividing the outcome by previous year’s emission (e.g., 
Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001).   
 Given that each chemical has different levels of toxicity, King and Myles-Shaver (2001) 
applied a reportable quantities (RQ) measure to the calculation of chemical emission and 
toxicity.  For more advanced weighting schema, Berrone & Gomez-Mejia (2009) weighted the 
quantity of each chemical emitted in a given year by its correspondent value of “human toxicity 
potential (HTP) factor” (Hertwich et at., 2001), which associates the TRI reporting chemicals 
with actual risks to human health by measuring toxicity in terms of cancer-causing vs. non-
cancer causing materials and the media through which chemicals are released (Berrone & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2009).  Although HTP is the most advanced weighting method in measuring 
toxicity, the following three approaches have been commonly used, since the methods have some 
strengths and weaknesses, as demonstrated in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Methods for Environmental Performance 
 
 Simple Aggregation RQ HTP 
Functions The total pounds each firm 
reported to the TRI as 
production waste, transfers 
offsite, and emissions 
Applying the weighting scheme 
developed by EPA to serve as a 
threshold for reporting 
accidental spills – “Reportable 
Quantities (RQ)” database in 
the CERCLA 
 
Applying “human toxicity 
potential factor” to assign 
different values to chemicals 
in terms of media (e.g., water 
& air) and carcinogens or non-
carcinogens. 
Strengths Simple Calculation; 
commonly used by the 
media, non-profit 
organizations, government; 
examining institutional 
pressure (Dosh, Dowell, & 
Toffel, 2013) 
 
Reflecting the fact that 
chemicals differ widely in their 
impacts by weighting each 
chemical by its toxicity 
Associating the results with 
actual risks to human health by 
measuring toxicity in terms of 
benzene equivalence or 
toluene equivalence and the 
medium in which chemical is 
released (air & water) 
Criticism Low precision (chemical 
toxicity and medium not 
considered) 
Less precision (chemical 
toxicity and medium less 
considered) (Toffel & Marshall, 
2004) 
 
Hart to match between the 
media in TRI and Human 
Toxicity Potential (HTP), 
particularly, land 
Studies in the 
management 
literature 
Chatterji & Toffel, 2010 
(SMJ); Dooley & Fryxell, 
1999 (JBE); Dosh, Dowell, 
& Toffel, 2013 (SMJ) 
King & Lenox, 2000 (AMJ); 
Russo & Harrison, 2005 (SMJ)  
Berrone & Gomez (2009) 
 
 To have a more realistic measurement for a proactive environmental action, I embedded a 
HTP weighting into data (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009) and additionally used a simple method 
to increase the validity of my measurement.  First, considering that the actual risks of emitted 
chemicals to human health vary across the sources of toxic chemicals such as water and air and 
the levels of toxicity such as cancer-causing and non-cancer-causing substances (Hertwich et al., 
2001), I weighted each of emitted chemicals by HTP index.  Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) 
suggest calculating the ratio of actual pollution to the predicted pollution based on the difference 
in production volume between time t-1 and time t.  The firms responsible for submitting TRI 
reports should report the change rate in production volume at t in comparison to production 
volume at time t-1.  The ratio serves as a critical threshold of estimating whether the volume of 
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emitted chemicals at t is excessive to the expected volume of chemical wastes at t in a facility 
level.   
PreEA it = Expected chemical release t – Actual chemical release it                                        [Formula-1] 
ECR it = Volume of released chemical it-1 x (Changed ratio in production volume it) [Formula-2] 
 
 Where PreEA it denotes a preventive environmental action at year t for an individual 
facility (i); ECR t denotes expected chemical release at year t for an individual facility (i).  To 
find the current year actual emitted volume of sample firms at a firm level, I transformed two 
different units (e.g., pound, gram) of weight for emitted chemicals into a standardized unit, 
pound.  I also multiplied HTP index by each of corresponding emitted chemicals to find 
standardized HTP-weighted chemical release at a facility level.  I used VLOOKUP function of 
an excel software program to match individual chemicals released from the same facility at both 
current (t) and prior years (t-1).  This matching at a facility level was critical since TRI database 
provided a facility-level changed rate in production volume [Formula 2] so that I could calculate 
a facility-level PEA, demonstrated in [Formula 1].  A poor match would result in an unrelated 
changed ratio in production volume, which would be applied and multiplied by prior year 
individual chemical release [Formula 1], thus misleading a current year expected chemical 
release (ECR).  Lastly, as firms have various numbers of facilities, I calculated a firm-level 
environmental preventive action by summing up all facility-level PEAs [Formula-3].    
      
Environmental Preventive Action = ∑ [(HTP-weighted prior year’s individual chemical 
release at t-1 x the ratio of current year’s production to prior year’s production volume) 
– {Reported individual chemical release at t – (Non adjusted individual chemical release 
– HTP adjusted individual chemical release)}]                                              [Formula-3] 
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 The positive and greater value from Formula-3 indicates a firm’s active involvement in 
reducing chemical release before the end of manufacturing pipelines.  Meanwhile, the lower and 
even negative value indicates a firm’s low involvement in preventing chemical release at a 
corresponding period, as actual chemical release exceeds expected chemical release (ECR) at a 
corresponding year.   
 Protective Environmental Action  Following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) and 
Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001), I operationalize a protective environmental action as the ratio of 
reduced chemical release by recycling, treating on-site and transferring to other location for 
further treatment to total chemical release of a corresponding year [Fomula-4].   This 
environmental action focuses on achieving legitimacy from stakeholders through less active 
environmental actions (Barreto, 2013; Hart, 1995).     
 For the numerator of a protective environmental action, I included items that represented 
a firm’s effort to reduce chemical release such as recycling on-site, recycling off-site, treatment 
on-site, and treatment off-site, which were all obtained from TRI database.  As there was no 
information on the media (e.g., land, water, or air) through which recycled chemicals were 
originally generated, I followed the Berrone & Gomez-Mejia (2009) approach which adopted an 
average HTP value of water and air media for individual chemicals [Formula-5].   For the 
denominator, I used total chemicals generated by a firm (Sarkis & Coreiro, 2001).  Regarding 
total release, it is notable that HTP-weighted measure can more precisely capture the differential 
toxicity of cancer and non-cancer causing chemicals on human health that come through water 
and air media.  As shown in Formula-6, I included reported individual chemical release and other 
wastes at year t such as total release, production wastes, and one-time release.  As these items 
were not weighted by HTP index, I deducted non-adjusted individual chemical release such as 
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fugitive air, stack air and water and then added HTP-weighted fugitive air, stack air and water 
[Formula-6] 
    
ProEA it = TCRE it / HAP it                                                                                                                                        [Formula-4] 
 
TCRE it = (Energy recovery on-site + Energy recovery off-site + Recycling on-site + Reclying 
off-site + Treatment on-site + Treatment off-site) x {HTP(air)+HTP(water)}/2 
[Formula-5] 
 
HAP it =  (Total release + Production waste + One-time release – (Fugitive Air1 + Stack Air2 + 
Water) + (HTP-weighted air1 + HTP-weighted air2 + HTP-weighted water) 
 [Formula-6] 
 
  
 Lastly, I calculated a firm-level chemical release by aggregating a current year’s total 
release and wastes from a facility level.  The formula of a protective environmental action at a 
firm level is as follows [Formula-7]:  
End-of-Pipe Protection =  ∑ {(Current year’s chemical release recycled, recovered, 
treated, and transferred to other sites x average value of corresponding HTP factors for 
air and water media for an individual chemicals) / {Reported individual chemical release 
at t  – (Non adjusted individual chemical release – HTP adjusted individual chemical 
release) }                                                                                                                                  [Formula-7] 
 
As a protective environmental action was operationalized as the ratio [Formula-4], higher 
ratio of end-of-pipe protection indicates that the firms intensively focus on minimizing released 
chemical wastes and pollutions through recycling, recovering, and transferring to other sites, 
whereas lower ratio means they engage less in the environmental activities.  If a protective 
environmental action is equal to zero, a firm does not make any efforts to reduce chemical 
release and wastes by either recycling or transferring to third places.  Meanwhile, if the action is 
equal to one, a firm recycles all released chemicals and wastes for a fiscal year.   
For the measurement of a protective environmental action, there should be no score 
above one, since firms cannot recycle more than they released.  However, it is notable that firms 
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being scored greater than 1 are often found in this measurement.  This is because I used the 
averaged HTP index of two media following Berrone & Gomez-Mejia ( 2009), as TRI data do 
not provide information on which medium a recycled chemical were originally produced through. 
For example, when a firm releases chemicals only through air medium, the use of averaged value 
that includes both air and water media may inflate or deflate the nominator.  Although the 
limitation in HTP-weighted measurement is present, the use of a simple method that does not 
consider different levels of toxicity across chemicals may provide more rough estimation of a 
firm’s environmental protective actions.               
Independent Variables 
 
 To measure the occurrence of a technological disaster, I constructed the independent 
variable as a binary variable using the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT, 2008).  The EM-
DAT, provided by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster at the Universite 
Catholique de Louvain in Belgium,  is widely used for academic purposes across multiple 
disciplines including geology, environmental science, coastal ocean engineering, finance 
(Coleman, 2006) and management (Oh & Oetzel, 2012).  The EM-DAT database classifies an 
external disruptive event into a disaster when the event falls under at least one of the following 
criteria: “10 or more people are reported killed; 100 or more people are reported affected, 
injured, and/or homeless; the government declares a state of emergency; the government requests 
international assistance.”   Among the reported disasters, I excluded the cases falling under 
sequential disaster that acts of Nature such as hurricanes and floods directly harmed 
technological capability of firms and thus resulted in human, financial, and environmental 
damages, as previously mentioned.    
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 Following the DM-DAT classification, I selected the cases corresponding to 
technological disasters that were directly or indirectly associated with the value chain and 
manufacturing activities of the firms in my sample industries such as paper and pulp (SIC 26), 
chemical (SIC 28), oil and gas (SIC 29), transportation manufacturers (SIC 37), and utilities (SIC 
49).  It is notable that a dozen reported disasters arose from transportation accidents such as 
plane crashes, derailment of trains, and vessel crashes into bridges and harbors in the DM-DAT.  
When a disaster’s cause was linked to employees who made a technological mismanagement 
(e.g., a pilot’s poor decision making as a determinant of a plane crash), the case was excluded 
since this study examined the acts of the firms only in the most polluting US industries where 
TRI data are available.   
 However, given that shipping chemicals, oils and gases through railroad and vessels is a 
crucial part of the supply chain for manufacturers, stakeholders tend to ambiguously categorize 
them into a guilty group (Zavyalova et al., 2012).  Thus, I included the cases that transportation 
accidents occurred in supply chain activities in my sample industries.  To identify the cases, I 
collected information on accident locations, dates, and involved organizations reported by the 
DM-DAT and investigated news articles and accident reports announced by NTSB (National 
Transportation Safety Board) and narrowed down my selection to 24 technological disasters that 
occurred in the five different industries during the observation period from 1994 to 2003 
(Appendix C).  Based on the operational definition of a technological disaster, 10 or more people 
died or 100 or more injured by a controllable and adjustable accident, I coded 1 for the industry 
that experienced one or more technological disasters in a given year.   Otherwise, it will be coded 
as 0.   
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 TMT Attention to the Natural Environment Ocasio (1997) defines it as “the noticing, 
encoding, understanding, and focusing of decision makers’ effort and time on the issues and the 
answers.”  Following Ocasio’s definition, I measured TMT attention to natural environmental 
issues by using content analysis of letters to shareholders (LTSs) that represent the focused 
attention of executive-level decision makers (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).    LTSs have been long 
used to identify and analyze the manifestation of top management team’s primary attention and 
communication (D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990; Homberg & Pflesser, 2000).  More importantly, 
LTSs are one of the most frequently used narrative documents identified as having external 
validity by previous studies (e.g., Short et al., 2010).   
 There are some debates as to whether LTS represents TMT attention or CEO attention, 
but using LTS for this study is appropriate since the letters are published through the process of 
coordinating the attention, interests, and prediction of TMT members through communication 
and filtering them into the most salient issues in which members are commonly interested (Cho 
& Hambrick, 2006).  In this study, the letters were collected from multiple archived databases to 
reduce missing observations and increase the reliability of data content.  A majority of letters 
were collected from firms’ annual reports posted on the website of U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Mergent Online, and Compact Disclosure.  These three complimentary archival 
data enabled me to check whether LTS was reported in a corresponding year.  Particularly, as the 
letters were not a mandatory document for publicly traded firms unlike other reports legally 
required by SEC, data collection was not smoothly made.  As supplementary document, MD&A 
and corporate information from Lexis-Nexis were used as references (Cho & Hambrick, 2006).  
 The period of documentation was the decade between 1995 and 2004.  Publicly traded 
firms issue an annual report that demonstrates a prior year’s performance and business 
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environments during the first half of the following year.  Firms publish an annual report of 2002, 
for instance, which is published from March to June of 2003.  The LTS published in 2003 is 
supposed to reflect TMT attention in 2002 and early 2003 including January and February.  In 
order to capture the extent to which a TMT is attentive to the issues of the natural environment 
for each year during the observational window, I reviewed the environmental management 
literature to choose some seed words that are most frequently used in the top-tier management 
journals
4
 and represent the natural environmental issues. 
 Although a few studies measure and empirically test the consciousness about natural 
environmental issues, most of them relied on cross-sectional data using questionnaires and thus 
could not account for possible analytical issues such as the possible influence of omitted missing 
variable on TMT attention (endogeneity), the serial correlation of prior year’s attention to current 
attention (autocorrelation), and inconstant variance across firms (heteroskedasiticity).  
Additionally, few studies suggested an exhaustive list of words that indicate natural 
environmental issues.   As the dictionary representing the natural environmental issues has yet to 
be developed, I employed an inductive approach to developing a word list, as suggested by Short 
et al. (2010). 
 First, I collected 838 LTSs from 98 firms during the 10-year observation period.  Second, 
I examined all letters to identify the words and phrases that represent TMT attention to natural 
                                                          
4
 Instead of referencing all articles, I list here alphabetically the authors and published year of the articles that I read 
for the purpose of identifying the seed words: Aragon Correa & Sharma (2003), Bansal & Roth (2000), Bansal 
(2004), Bansal & Clelland (2004), Bansal & Hunt (2003), Barnett (2007), Barnett & King (2008), Berchicci, 
Dowell, & King (2012), Berron & Gomez-Mejia (2009), Berrone, Fosfuri, & Gelabert (2013), Bigley & Roberts 
(2001), Chatterji & Toffel (2010), Christmann (2000), Coleman (2006), Darnall (2003; 2006), Demas & Toffel 
(2004), Dibrell, Craig, Kim, and Aaron (2014), Dosh, Dowell, & Toffel (2013), Eesley & Lenox (2006), Etzion 
(2007), Flammer (2013), Gill (2007), Hart (1995; 2011), King (2007),  King & Lenox (2000), King, Lenox, & 
Terlaak (2005), King & Shaver (2001), Knock, Santalo, & Diestre (2012), Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead 
(2007), Marguis & Toffel (2012), Oh & Oetzel (2011), Prakash & Kollman (2004), Roberts (1990), Russo & Fouts 
(1997), Russo & Harrison (2005), Sarkis & Cordeiro (2001), Sharfman (1996), Sharma (2000), Sharma & 
Vredenburg (1998), Walls, Berrone, & Phan (2012), Wang & Choi (2013)  
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environmental issues and answers and assessed whether the words were aligned with the concept 
of natural environmental issues considering the context for each letter.  Judge and Douglas 
(1998) posit the issues are not limited to the ideas of compliance with stakeholder expectation 
manifested through environmental regulations and concerns and also include proactive 
considerations going beyond compliance that are explicitly addressed in TMT strategic planning 
process and are recorded within the firm’s official statement such as mission statements and 
annual reports.  Andersson and Bateman (2000) classify environment issues that businesses face 
into air pollution, solid waste disposal, topsoil erosion, ozone layer depletion, population growth, 
marine and fresh water pollution, toxic waste accumulation and disposal, reduction in 
biodiversity, wetlands destruction, deforestation, and climate modification.  Similarly, Carroll & 
Buchholtz (2002) suggests eight key global natural environmental issues that include ozone 
depleting, global warming, sold and hazardous wastes, fresh water quantity and quality, 
degradation of marine environments, deforestation, land degradation, endangerment of biological 
diversity.  By definition, attention embraces not only problems or concerns but also the answers 
to corresponding problems (Ocasio, 1997), I included TMT consideration of how to ameliorate 
opportunities and reduce threats from the natural environments as answers in the category of 
TMT attention to natural environmental issues.   
 Third, four experts who had expertise in the organization and the natural environment 
literature assessed how closely the collected words were associated with the attention to natural 
environmental issues and rated the association by using a scale ranging from 1 (not associated) to 
7 (definitely associated).  Following Cho & Hambrick (2006), I calculated inter-rater reliability 
using Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC), which was 0.76.  In the social science, when ICC 
is larger than 0.72, it is considered that adequate reliability is present.  Based on the scale, I 
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retained any words that were rated 5 or more from the four raters.  The raters and I discussed 
some words that were dropped in the validation process, but were potentially associated with 
natural environmental issues, and reselected some words on which we agreed.   
 Lastly, after going through the process, I compared the number of the words mentioned in 
each of the letters to the total number of letter written in LTS in order to standardize TMT 
attention to natural environmental issues.  Among the three content analysis programs that are 
accepted to management research, I used the Mac-version of LIWC that captures phrases as well 
as words and provides text-highlighting functions to increase between-reviewer reliability of 
selected words.       
Moderating Variables 
 
 Concentration Ownership is operationalized by the percentage of a firm’s outstanding 
shares held by shareholders who owne at least 5% of the equity or blockholders (Bethel & 
Liebeskind, 1993; Fidrmuc, Georgen, & Renneboog, 2006).   As my sample firms are publicly 
traded firms, their ratio of the number of blockholder to the number of small shareholder is 
smaller than the ratio for non-publicly traded firms.  Also, the position of blockholders within an 
organization is distinguishable and they draw more TMT attention than do small shareholders 
(Earle, Kucsera, & Telegdy, 2005).  For the measurement, I employed a continuous variable, 
while some prior studies used a dummy variable with a threshold of 5% ownership held by a 
shareholder (e.g., Li, 1994).  Therefore, 5% ownership is widely used to identify whether 
ownership is concentrated to shareholders.    
 Outside Director As this study aims to examine the influence of outside directors having 
heterogeneous background, experience, and insight on business, I used the number of outside 
board members with no personal or professional relationship with the firm (Arthaud-day et al., 
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2006), as opposed to inside board members who have former and current employment 
relationships and work for an affiliated organization.      
 Instead of using the proportion of independent directors to board size, using the actual 
number of independent directors as a proxy helps researchers to better understand heterogeneity 
in expertise and the possibility that various issues and answers are identified (Anderson, Mansi, 
& Reeb, 2004).  These benefits are particularly important in predicting its conditional effect on 
TMT attention that is manifested through focusing time and effort on issues and answers.   
 CEO Duality a dichotomous variable was used to measure whether CEO serves as a 
chairperson for the board of directors (Boyd, 1994).  To identify CEO duality, I consulted def 
(14) or proxy statement for publicly traded firm collected through corporate filings.   When 
duality is identified, the focal will be coded as 1.  Otherwise, it will be coded as 0 (Tuggle et al., 
2010).   
 Family Influence In order to examine the influence of family members on TMT attention, 
I operationalized it as a firm in which at least one or more family members serve as either one of 
TMT members or chairperson of boards (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001).  As family members are 
those who are related by either marriage or blood to founding and owing family (Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012), I will match the last name of current directors and officers to that of founding 
family (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Becerra, 2010).  The information on the 
founding family’s last name will be collected from Lexis-Nexis, web searches and company 
websites and the information on the name of current directors and officers will be collected from 
Compact Disclosure of 2005.    
 Similarity to an Accident Firm The variable indicates the degree of similarity between an 
accident firm and a focal firm.    For the measurement of similarity in organizational size, Baum, 
 58 
 
Li, & Usher (2000) adopted context similarity operationalized by geographical similarity in 
located latitude between a firm’s prior acquisition and a target firm.  Similarly, I employed the 
concept of geographical distance between the state that a focal firm’s headquarter was located 
and the state an accident happened for the corresponding observation period. I used a dummy 
variable coding 1 if a focal firm’s headquarter and an accident facility are in the same or 
regionally neighboring state, and 0 otherwise (Tsai, 2000).     
 Absorptive Capacity Cohen and Levinthal (1990) conceptualize it as a firm’s ability to 
“recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (p. 128).  
The knowledge accumulated through investment enables firms to learn technology-based new 
capabilities and information promptly (Nelson & Winter, 1982), thus increasing responsiveness 
of R&D to value-creating or threat-neutralizing opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  Thus, 
such learning incentives are increased when R&D intensity is high.   
 A few studies have empirically tested corporate-level absorptive capacity: Stock, Greis, 
& Fisher (2001) who operationalize it as R&D intensity and measure it by dividing R&D 
expenditure by annual sales; Zahra & Hayton (2008) use R&D expense for the measurement.  
Following Cohen and Levinthal (1990), I will draw on R&D intensity operationalized as R&D 
expense divided by sales to measure absorptive capacity of publicly traded firms.  As the target 
firms are all publicly traded S&P 1500 firms, the financial data are available. 
 Performance relative to aspiration Levels is defined as a mixture of social performance 
level and historical performance level (Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Park, 2007).  Following 
Bromiley and Harris (2014) and Greve (2003), I used weighted average model that combine 
historical and social aspiration in the same model [Formula-8].  
 Ati = aiSAti + (1 – a1) HAti                                                                                                          [Formula-8] 
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Where A denotes aspiration level; SA denotes social aspiration level; HA represents historical 
aspiration; ai represents a weight.  For social aspiration (SA), I calculated the industry average 
ROA, and ROS, as suggested by Greve (2003) and ROI during a current year.  For historical 
aspiration (HA), I used a prior year performance (ROA, ROS, and ROI) of a focal firm.  In the 
weighted average model, the weights for social and historical aspirations can be differentially 
allocated in accordance with how each of social and historical performances looks salient to 
TMT members 
 Among three values for the weight 25, 50, and 75 (Baum, Rowley, & Shipilov, 2005), I 
put equal weights between the two aspirations by selecting the value of 0.5.  For the robustness 
of measurement, I also applied 0.25 and 0.5 to the model as well.  I used a dummy variable 
coding 1 if a focal firm’s performance (e.g., ROI) is above the calculated aspiration level and 0 
otherwise 
Control Variables 
 For the analysis, I included several control variables that influence TMT attention and a 
firm’s environmental actions.  To control for financial capacity that possibly affect TMT 
attention and propensity (Devers et al., 2013), net income was included.  Assuming that large 
firms in my sample may have more possibility of being attentive to natural environmental issues 
than small firms due to their manufacturing capacity, I include firm size operationalized by 
assets of a focal firm in a fiscal year (Zavyalova et al., 2012).   
 As industry munificence is characterized by industry-based stabilized environments due 
to growth, and opportunities (Dess & Beard, 1984), abundant industries might lead a TMT to be 
less attentive to its financial performance than scare industries (Shepherd, Patzelt, & Baron, 
2013).   For the measurement of munificence, I used a standardized measure of industry sales 
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growth to measure munificence over its recent 5-year period.   For the measurement of 
complexity, I took into consideration the number of firms in an industry and their market shares 
based on sales.  Following the logic of Herfindahl index, I summed up the squared market shares 
of all firms in an industry.  The outcome, 1, indicates a monopolistic market while 0 means 
perfect competition of the industry.    
 All of these industry-level data were acquired from COMPUSTATE in the basis of the 
primary two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code (Lester et al., 2006) and I 
calculated 5-year industry sales growth, its standard deviation, and the sum of the squared market 
shares of all firm in each industry for 11 years from 1993 to 2003.  These industry conditions are 
necessarily considered since a firm’s environmental performance is anticipated to be associated 
with the threats of competitors, the degree of demands for a firm’s primary products and services, 
and the changes in technology.      
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESULTS 
 
 Following Baron and Kenny (1986) and Edward and Lambert (2007), I focused on 
combining moderation and mediation to test for the conditional indirect effect of corporate 
governance and vicarious learning (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007).  This moderated causal 
step approach is distinguishable from a testing for mediation and moderation separately and a 
subgroup approach, which tests for the conditional effect of corporate governance and vicarious 
separately (Edward & Lambert, 2007).   
 Considering all hypothesized moderators in the same equation, a moderated casual step 
approach appropriately suppresses possible inflated relationships among variables that should 
otherwise have occurred.  More importantly, the aforementioned approach has limited ability to 
provide the direct evidence for the causality of a technological disaster to a focal firm’s 
environmental actions, as mediated by TMT attention, with theoretically important boundary 
conditions considered.   
 To test the conditional indirect effects of seven different moderators on a firm’s 
environmental actions through TMT attention as a mediator simultaneously, I employed a 
structural equation modeling (SEM) that identified the significance of path estimation among 
these theoretical constructs and provided a holistic approach so that I could appropriately bond 
attention-based view with conditional indirect process (Bagozzi & Yi, 2011).  Within the overall 
framework of a structural equation modeling, three different regression equations having a 
demeaned first-difference estimation were placed to test for the causality of a technological 
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disaster and a firm’s environmental actions, as mediated by TMT attention (Baron & Kenny, 
1986; Edward & Lambert, 2007; Mathieu & Taylor, 2006).    
 To examine how firms were involved in environmental actions in response to a 
technological disaster, I compared the levels of attention and actions that were hypothesized to 
be different between a group exposed to a technological disaster and the other not exposed to 
them by examining the coefficient for a technological disaster.  I also investigated the effect of a 
technological disaster on TMT attention, the interactional effect between the disaster and 
variables for corporate governance/vicarious learning on the attention, and furthermore the 
mediating effect of the TMT attention.   
Empirical Model 
  To estimate the coefficient of a technological disaster, I chose to use a demeaned first-
differencing estimation, which allows researchers to test for the effect of the change in internal 
and external events such as the change in governmental policy (Card and Kreuge, 1994), change 
in industrial practices (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010), and the change in board independence 
(Anderson et al., 2004).  I used a demeaned first-differencing estimation in the SEM and 
examined the difference between  TMT attention of i at time t and a group-mean of TMT 
attention of i, assuming that there is no effect of difference in between-group estimation (e.g., no 
effect of unobserved time-invarying distinctions between Ford and Boeing on TMT attention).   
The assumption is possible because an individual firm’s fixed effect is eliminated when a group 
mean of individual effect is cancelled out with a fixed effect at time t that is assumed to be 
consistent across the window of observation period.  This is, controlling for unobserved time-
invarying effects of an individual firm, this demeaned first-differencing estimation makes the 
covariance between change in technological disaster (IV) and change in error term equal to zero, 
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thus correcting for endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2009).  In the case that data to measure the 
unobservable variable in error term are not available, a demeaned first-differencing estimation 
can provide a solution to the omitted variable bias.  Additionally, the first-differencing can 
correct for serial correlation by calculating differences among pairs of observations and thus 
making a non-stationary series stationary.     
 As data were randomly collected from various sources, it might be reasonable to assume 
no covariance between idiosyncratic errors (ui) across different time points and no 
heteroskedasiticity/ serial correlation.  However, the results of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroskedasticity demonstrated that variance was not constant    (chi 
2
= 47.86; 
Prob>chi
2
 < 0.05), whereas the results of Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
indicated no first-order autocorrelation (F-statistic = 2.16; Prob>F = 0.15).  As previously 
demonstrated, the first-differencing made a non-stationary series stationary by calculating 
differences among pairs of observations and thus eliminated auto correlations.  To correct for 
heteroskedasiticity, I used robust standard errors.   
 Given that I used a binary variable coding 0 if a sample firm is affiliated with the industry 
experiencing a technological disaster at time t and otherwise coding 1, the panel data for this 
study and the use of a demeaned first-differencing estimation made it possible for me to identify 
whether the occurrence of a technological disaster leads to distinguishable difference in TMT 
attention between two groups.  After dummy coding, I calculated the deviation of TMT attention 
to natural environmental issues at a specific year from the group-mean of TMT attention, as 
previously described.   
  The effect of a public policy, which is characterized by a single occurrence such as 
deregulation (Cho & Hambrick, 2006) and environmental rating (Chatterji & Toeffle, 2010),  
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tends to have a clear distinction in period between pre- and post-occurrence, meanwhile 
unprecedented but possibly repeatable technological disasters do not provide a clear post-disaster 
period, since, unlike the duration of institutionalized governmental policies and industrial 
practices, the duration of a technological disaster tends to vary across cases as they are not 
institutionalized.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a technological disaster affects TMT 
attention for a short-term period time such as up to 1 year following the occurrence and TMT 
attention manifested in letters to shareholders (LTSs)  does not reflect a technological disaster 
that happened more than a year ago.  This approach is different from the measures adopted by 
other studies that examine the effect of an external event on a firm by focusing on difference in 
TMT attention between pre and posttest tests.  
Empirical Results 
 Path analysis using SEM was conducted with the statistical software package STATA 
12.0.  Table 4 shows correlations among constructs and Table 5 presents the number of 
observation, means, and standard deviation for the variables in the regressions.  In table 6, there 
were low correlation (range of relationships = |.0| to |0.14|) among family influence, CEO 
duality, ownership concentration, and outsider directors falling under the same construct of 
corporate governance.  There were also low correlation (range of relationships =|.0| to |.06|) 
among similarity to accident firms, aspiration relative to aspiration, and absorptive capacity 
falling under the same construct of vicarious learning.   
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
 
`Var 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Pro 1.00 
              2. Pre 0.01 1.00 
             
3. TA 0.07 
-
0.03 1.00 
            4. TD 0.01 0.06 0.10 1.00 
           
5. FI 
-
0.08 0.05 0.05 
-
0.06 1.00 
          
6. CD 0.07 0.09 0.00 
-
0.06 
-
0.01 1.00 
         
7. AC 0.03 0.00 0.05 
-
0.08 0.04 0.00 1.00 
        
8. OD 
-
0.01 0.04 
-
0.04 
-
0.04 0.12 
-
0.03 0.05 1.00 
       
9. OC 0.07 0.00 
-
0.06 
-
0.07 
-
0.14 0.06 
-
0.01 0.03 1.00 
      
10. GS 
-
0.01 
-
0.02 0.03 0.25 0.11 
-
0.01 
-
0.05 0.13 
-
0.03 1.00 
     
11. PA 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.02 
-
0.04 
-
0.02 
-
0.06 0.10 1.00 
    
12. MU  0.07 
-
0.04 
-
0.03 0.13 0.11 0.06 
-
0.11 
-
0.06 0.00 0.06 0.10 1.00 
   
13. CO 
-
0.03 0.04 0.04 
-
0.01 0.08 
-
0.02 
-
0.10 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 1.00 
  
14. AS 
-
0.02 
-
0.10 0.06 
-
0.04 
-
0.04 0.08 0.15 
-
0.07 0.08 
-
0.14 
-
0.13 
-
0.08 
-
0.08 1.00 
 
15. RE 
-
0.01 
-
0.07 
-
0.01 0.05 0.00 
-
0.04 
-
0.05 0.11 
-
0.05 0.03 0.05 
-
0.01 
-
0.07 0.05 1.00 
‘ 
*Legends: Pro = Protective environmental action; Pre = Preventive environmental action; TA = TMT attention; TD 
= Technological disaster; FI = Family influence; CD = CEO duality; AC = Absorptive capacity; OD = Outside 
directors; OC = Ownership concentration; GS = Geographic similarity; PA = Performance above aspiration; MU = 
Munificence; CO = Complexity; AS = Asset; RE = Revenue 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
TMT attention to natural environmental issues 838 0.17 0.36 
ln_ Protective environmental action 875 5.14 4.37 
ln_ Preventive environmental action 874 23.29 0.15 
Technological disaster 970 0.20 0.40 
Family influence 970 0.17 0.37 
Duality 954 0.81 0.40 
Outside directors 951 9.22 2.68 
Ownership Concentration 915 25.55 24.37 
Similarity to accident firm 969 0.17 0.38 
Absorptive capacity 628 0.04 0.41 
Aspiration 968 0.67 0.47 
Munificence 955 0.07 0.04 
Complexity 955 0.04 0.02 
No. of employee 934 36811.96 73493.96 
Asset 970 17517.93 41597.25 
 
 
 The structural model I tested fits the data well.  First of all, I compared my hypothesized 
model with a saturated model, which used all of variances, covariance, and means of the 
observed variables.  As the saturated model becomes a reference, a small difference between two 
models (chi
2
) indicates a good fit of the hypothesized model.  The results were Chi
2
 = 0.116; 
P>Chi
2
= 0.99 , indicating that the hypothesized model fits a saturated model.  Additionally, I 
examined standardized root mean square residual that represents the standardized difference 
between the observed correlation and the predicted correlation.  Given that the value less than 
0.08 is considered a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), this absolute measure of fit was 0.001, which 
indicates a good fit.   Also, RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) indicate good fit 
(RMSEA =0.00), since its value of 0.05 or less indicate there is a good model fit.   PCLOSE, 
which tests the null hypothesis that RMSEA is no greater than 0.05, was 0.99, indicating that 
RMSEA is less than 0.05 and supporting that the SEM model has a good fit.   
 Table 6 shows the results from SEM for hypothesis 1, the effect of a technological 
disaster on TMT attention to natural environmental issues.  The coefficient of the change in a 
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technological disaster was s positive and statistically significant (b= 0.05; p<0.05 two-tailed).  
As a demeaned first-differencing estimation was used, the coefficient for a technological disaster 
suggests the extent to which TMT attention of i at time t was deviated from the group-mean of 
TMT attention of i by one-unit change in technological disaster.  The change in a technological 
disaster by one unit is estimated to increase by 0.05 units in how much TMT is attentive to 
natural environment issues (p<0.05 two-tailed).  As the variable, a technological disaster, is 
dichotomous, it might be more appropriate to interpret that when a technological disaster 
happens, TMT attention for firms influenced by a technological disaster is estimated to be higher 
than those not influenced.    
 
Table 6 
Parameter Estimates for Hypothesized Model using SEM 
 
Path Path Coefficient  z 
Technological disaster  TMT attention 0.05** 2.09 
TD*Ownership Concentration  TMT attention -0.004** 2.10 
TD*Outside directors  TMT attention 0.03** 2.19 
TD*CEO duality  TMT attention -0.01 0.09 
TD*Family  TMT attention 0.29* 1.34 
TD*Similarity to accident firm  TMT attention -0.1** 2.45 
TD*Absorptive capacity  TMT attention -3.25* 1.78 
TD*Aspiration  TMT attention 0.01 0.09 
TMT attention  Protective Action 1.12* 1.82 
TMT attention  Preventive Action -0.02 0.36 
Note. Model fit statistics: LR test of model vs. Saturated: chi
2
(3) = 0.13, prob>chi
2
 = 0.99 
Obs.: 476 
***: P<0.01 (one-tailed) 
**: P<0.05 (one-tailed) 
*: p<0.1 (one-tailed) 
 
 
 Hypothesis 2, which states that ownership concentration positively moderates the 
relationship between technological disaster and TMT attention, was supported (b= -0.004; 
p<0.05 one-tailed).  To interpret the results from the moderation analysis, I followed the 
guidance provided by Aiken and West (1991) and Hayes (2013).  Figure 3 demonstrated that 
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when ownership was concentrated, the effect of a technological disaster made a TMT more 
attentive to natural environmental issues.   
 
Figure 3 
Interaction of Technological Disaster and Ownership Concentration on TMT Attention to 
Natural Environmental Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 3 that outside directors positively moderates the relationship between 
technological disaster and TMT attention was supported (b=0.03; p<0.05 one-tailed).  It 
indicates that the effect of a technological disaster on TMT attention depends on the extent to 
which outside directors are involved. In Figure 4, the slopes of the lines correspond to the 
conditional effects of a technological disaster on TMT attention for outside director.  As shown, 
the effect of a technological disaster about TMT attention was positive when the presence of 
outside directors was high, while the effect was negative when their presence was low.  That is, 
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the effect of a technological disaster appears to be larger among the firms having high 
involvement of outside directors than among the firms having low involvement of outside 
directors, thus supporting hypothesis 3.     
 
Figure 4 
Interaction of Technological Disaster and Outside Director on TMT Attention to Natural 
Environmental Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 4 that CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between 
technological disaster and TMT attention was not supported (b=-0.01; p>0.1 one-tailed).  
Although it was not statistically significant, the directionality indicates its potential negative 
effect on the disaster and attention relationship. 
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Figure 5 
Interaction of Technological Disaster and Family on TMT Attention to Natural 
Environmental Issues 
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 5 that family influence positively moderates the relationship between 
technological disaster and TMT attention was marginally supported (b=0.29; p<0.1 one-tailed).  
The result indicates that the effect of a technological disaster on TMT attention depends on 
family influence.  Among the firms that are influenced by a founder’s family, the occurrence of a 
technological disaster has more positive effects on TMT attention than among those not 
influenced by a founder’s family.  Figure 5 illustrates the slopes of the lines correspond to the 
conditional effects of a technological disaster on TMT attention for the presence of family 
influence.  The slopes were positive for both the firms being a family firm and those not.  
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However, it graphically shows that among the firms influenced by a founder’s family, the effect 
of a technological disaster on TMT attention is larger than among the firms not influenced.   
 For vicarious learning, I investigated three different moderators including similarity to an 
accident firm, a firm’s absorptive capacity, and a firm’s achievement of aspiration level.  None 
of hypothesis was found to be statistically significant.  Particularly, hypothesis 6 that similarity 
to an accident firm positively moderates the disaster and attention relationship and hypothesis 7 
that a firm’s absorptive capacity positively moderates the disaster and attention relationship were 
found to be statistically significant but in an opposite direction. 
 Hypothesis 9 that TMT attention increase a firm’s preventive environmental actions was 
not supported (b=-0.02; p<0.37 one-tailed).  Meanwhile, the hypothesis 10 that TMT attention 
increases a firm’s protective environmental actions was marginally supported (b=1.13; p<0.1 
one-tailed).  The result indicates firms having TMT attention higher by 1 point subsequently 
increased its protective environmental action by 1.13 point.    
 I tested hypotheses 1 to 10 using structural equation modeling.  Although a demeaned 
first-differencing approach (within-estimator) controlled for endogenity and autocorrelation, it 
lacked the treatment for heteroskedasticity.  For the robustness of the result, I ran a demeaned 
first-differencing regression model two times, one for hypotheses from 1 to 8 with TMT 
attention placed as a dependent variable and the other for hypotheses from 9 to 10 with a firm’s 
environmental actions as dependent variables.  Three regressions used standard errors that are 
robust to the presence of heteroskedasiticity.  The results as seen in Table-10 were fairly 
consistent with those from structural equation modeling except that ownership concentration that 
was significant became marginally significant and family influence that was marginally 
significant turned significant. 
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 Hypothesis 11 that TMT attention will mediate the effect of a technological disaster on a 
firm’s environmental action was not supported (Indirect Effect on a preventive environmental 
action: z=0.36; p>0.1; Indirect effect on a protective environmental action: z=1.37; p>0.1).   
 In sum, the moderating effects of outside directors and family influence on the 
relationship between technological disaster and TMT attention to natural environmental issues 
was found significant, as illustrated in Figure 5 and 6.  The findings indicate that when the two 
elements of corporate governance structurally distribute communication channels, the occurrence 
of a technological disaster becomes more salient to a TMT.  It is more interesting to consider that 
neither of family influence (z=0.67; p>0.1) nor outside directors (z= 1.56; p>0.1) was 
significantly related to TMT attention. 
 The results do support family influence and outside directors serve as moderating the 
relationship between a technological disaster and TMT attention, while I did not found any 
support for the moderating effect of variables for vicarious learning (Table-6).  A summary of 
the results for each hypothesis can be found in Table-7.  
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Table 7 
Summary of Results 
 
Hypothesis Result 
H 1: Technological disaster is positively associated with TMT attention to natural environmental 
(NE) issues. 
Supported 
H 2: Ownership Concentration will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT 
attention relationship. 
Supported 
H 3: Outside directors will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT attention 
relationship. 
Supported 
H 4: CEO duality will negatively moderate the technological disaster and TMT attention 
relationship. 
Not supported 
H 5: Family influence will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT attention 
relationship.    
Marginally 
Supported 
H 6: Similarity to accident firm will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT 
attention relationship. 
Not supported 
H 7: Absorptive capacity will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT attention 
relationship. 
Not supported 
H 8: Performance above aspiration will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT 
attention relationship. 
Not supported 
H 9: TMT attention is positively associated with preventive environmental action. 
 
Not supported 
H10: TMT attention is positively associated with protective environmental action. 
 
Marginally 
supported 
H11: TMT will mediate the effect of technological disaster on preventive environmental action 
 
Not supported 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  
 I began this study by noting the needs for understanding of how TMTs are sometimes 
committed to a risky and short-term unprofitable environmental action and why they often fail to 
be a key champion for the actions.  Drawing on the attention-based view, I proposed that 
corporate governance and vicarious learning lead a TMT to attend to and engage in various 
levels of environmental actions across firms in ways that influence a TMT to reframe its 
perspective (i.e., structural process) on technological disasters and facilitate internal 
communication (i.e., social cognitive process), thus enhancing organization-level selective 
attention to environmental issues.      
 To explain this mechanism, I highlighted the role of TMT attention to natural 
environmental issues in achieving environmentally responsible actions as part of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).    Given that the primary group responsible for making CSR decisions and 
actions is a TMT, it should be challenging to advance our understanding of a theoretical 
mechanism of creating environmentally responsible actions without observing the social 
cognitive and structural process of developing TMT attention.  It is worthwhile to note the 
ceaseless debates about the relationship between CSR and firm performance, which can be 
partially ascribed to the lack of observation of decision makers and their attention.  Without that 
observation, researchers need to make some assumptions about the behaviors of managers in 
which there has long been a gap in perspectives on CSR between stakeholder theory and agency 
theory.  The former theory assuming stakeholders as information and opportunity providers 
views CSR as instrumental to performance, whereas the latter theory assuming that CSR harms a 
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firm’s performance posits that CSR should be made within performance (Jo & Harjoto, 2012).  
The gap has not been narrowed and the coexistence of the two dominant theoretical perspectives 
has continued to incur an ambiguous relationship.    
 Drawing on virtual ethic theory, Chun (2005) sees a firm’s responsible behavior as 
originating from organizational virtue run by managers who have strong aspiration values for 
ethics.  As an individual ethical value serves as an aspiration point, firms tend to engage in 
responsible actions and satisfy stakeholders’ expectations.  Having a more utilitarian perspective, 
I argued that TMT attention strengthened by organizational characteristics is a key antecedent to 
a firm’s environmentally responsible actions. As part of corporate governance that facilitates a 
TMT to have a sensitive framework of natural environmental issues, ownership dispersal, a 
founder’s family influence, outside directors, and separate functions of CEO and a chairman of 
the board were hypothesized to have positive moderating effects on the relationship between a 
technological disaster and TMT attention to natural environmental issues.   
 Using longitudinal data of S&P 1500 listed firms affiliated with heavily polluting 
industries (Bansal & Clellend, 2004), I tested for the indirect effect of technological disaster on a 
firm’s environmental action, as mediated by TMT attention to natural environmental issues.  
Plus, I tested for the conditional indirect effect of corporate governance and vicarious learning on 
a firm’s environmental action, as mediated by TMT attention.  The 10-year period observation 
was effective in removing an individual firm’s unique time-invarying unobservable effects so 
that I identified the net effect of a technological disaster on TMT attention, the moderating effect 
of a majority of the variables for corporate governance on the disaster-TMT attention 
relationship, and the effect of TMT attention on a firm’s protective environmental action.     
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 Whereas a chain of events between a technological disaster and TMT attention and 
between TMT attention and a protective environmental action were identified, the indirect effect 
of a technological disaster on the environmental action was not found in this study.  Specifically 
speaking, I found the firms strongly attentive to the issues tend to marginally engage in 
protective actions but no significant relationship between TMT attention and preventive actions 
was found.   This finding indicates that TMT attention might be a necessary condition, but not 
sufficient enough to drive a firm’s environmental actions by taking risks.  This suggests that 
considering the boundary condition of the relationship provides a good understanding of the 
following question: under what conditions does TMT increase its attention enough to take risks 
and implement what they are attending to? 
 In   Ocasio’s (1997) conceptual research, the relationship between TMT attention and 
organizational movement is explained by managers’ identities and interests.  Given that the 
attention-based view follows the assumption of the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF), a 
dominant coalition’s bounded rationality leads to uncertainty avoidance (Cyert & March, 1963).  
Unless there is managerial motivation to invest in environmental actions large enough to offset 
uncertainty, selective attention is less anticipated to be linked to a firm’s environmental actions.  
The associations between TMT attention and a firm’s environmental actions would be strongly 
significant, if a TMT is better able to predict that environmental actions will contribute to 
maintaining its identities and interests.  
 The underlying logic of behavioral perspectives in the environmental management 
literature is that TMT attention to environmental issues motivates a firm to engage in either 
developing environmental competency, achieving environmental legitimacy or both when a 
dominant coalition in an organization perceives threats to its position.  The attention enables a 
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TMT to better understand and predict the extent to which technological disasters will bring about 
the loss of performances by insiders, and a dominant coalition will be threatened due to the loss 
and be replaced by a newly emerging coalition having an appropriate capability to be able to 
address environmental issues (Baum, Flemming, and Singer, 1983; Cyert & March, 1963).  That 
is, high TMT attention functions as alerting the dominant coalition to the threats to continuity of 
its identities and interests before managerial competencies and tacit knowledge held by the 
dominant coalition are replaced by a group having a new cognitive framework (Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000).     
Corporate Governance and Vicarious Learning 
 The results of testing for the moderating effect of corporate governance and vicarious 
learning on TMT attention indicated that ownership concentration, family influence and outside 
directors increase the impact of a technological disaster on TMT attention, but none of the 
variables for vicarious learning did.   According to Ocasio (1997), rules and rule makers in an 
organization play a critical role in influencing the direction of communication, formulating 
organization-level attention, and strategic orientation (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).  In that sense, 
controlling shareholders, a founder’s family influence, and outside directors were identified as 
critical players who effectively affect interests and identities of TMT by distributing the 
communication channels. 
 Under such a crisis condition as the impact of a technological disaster, long-term oriented 
goals influenced by controlling shareholders and family members were found to moderate the 
relationship between a technological disaster and TMT attention.  Further, extensive concerns 
and interests ignited by outside directors were identified to distribute the communication 
channels that have TMT managers more responsive to events that could adversely affect a firm’s 
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long-term performance for various reasons and communicate more about relevant issues and 
answer.   
 However, the findings that CEO duality did not support hypotheses led me to consider 
the possibility that CEO duality may serve differently in the period of crisis than in the normal 
business period.  Unlike the traditional perspective of CEO duality that highlighted agency 
problems such as entrenchment and risk avoidance caused by leveraging on his/her power for 
his/her personal wealth, some new perspectives tend to view CEO duality as a driver of a strong 
transformative leadership, particularly in the period of crisis and uncertainty such as when a 
technological disaster and its negative spillover in an overall industry happen.  I assume that non-
significant results for CEO duality may represent its mixed effect on TMT attention.  Therefore, 
there seems to be a decent possibility of being able to explore the boundary condition of CEO 
duality, particularly in relation to crisis management. 
 Unlike hypotheses related to corporate governance, none of three hypotheses for a firm’s 
vicarious learning were supported in my study.  They are conceptually important and meaningful 
in that social cognitive processes that occur among TMT members are facilitated when 
organizational characteristics provide decent conditions for learning other firms’ actions and 
practices from a distance.  A firm’s absorptive capacity, achievement of its aspiration level, and 
similarity to an accident firm were hypothesized to motivate TMT members to communicate 
with one another to learn more about why technological disasters happened and how other firms 
addressed them.    
 I measured absorptive capacity calculating as R&D expenses divided by sales.  About a 
third of my sample firms did not report R&D expenses or allocate capital budget into R&D 
activities during an observation period from 1993 to 2003.   In the case that firms are strongly 
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expressing environmental concerns and strengths through letters to shareholders without 
budgeting R&D expenses, the moderating effect of absorptive capacity can be reversed, as 
opposed to hypothesis 7 that absorptive capacity will positively moderate the disaster and TMT 
attention relationship.    
 Furthermore, I also note the possibility that firms having high absorptive capacity may be 
internally oriented when they seek solutions to potential threats created by unprecedented 
disasters.  This logic is possible when the attribute of absorptive capacity, path-dependency, is 
considered.  Absorptive capacity is a firm’s dynamic capability to absorb new knowledge 
relevant to a firm’s existing knowledge system and thus enhance its routine and process (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990).  High absorptive capacity tends to lead firms to be externally oriented and 
acquire and assimilate new knowledge and apply it to problems, but its relevance to existing 
knowledge systems or path-dependence facilitates a firm’s routinization by selectively attending 
to what a firm has to know based on what it knows (Todorova & Durisin, 2007).   
 Based on the concept of path-dependence, there is the likelihood that when an event 
irrelevant to a firm’s knowledge system, such as a technological disaster, it might be less 
attentive to natural environmental issues than a firm having low absorptive capacity.  The path-
dependence may have a TMT apply what it has acquired when noticing and encoding a 
technological disaster and interpret the threat by focusing on internally routinized knowledge, 
rather than focusing its attention on external cues for a solution (Gavetti, 2005).  For the firms 
having high absorptive capacity, a technological disaster might be an event that has a TMT take 
its attention away from  the issues encompassing the natural environment to the internal process, 
as suggested by statistical results  (z= -3.25; p<0.1; one-tailed).      
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 This study also found that high TMT attention contributes to a firm’s protective 
environmental actions, while the attention does not lead to a firm’s preventive environmental 
actions.  These findings are consistent with the explanation for the boundary condition for a 
firm’s environmental action.  High TMT attention to natural environmental issues seems to be 
sufficient conditions for achieving environmental legitimacy with low risks and costs, but a TMT 
with high attention does not necessarily have a firm engage in environmental actions for 
environmental competency that entails high risks and costs.  The conditions that transformed 
attention into motivation to implement green actions will explain a substantial portion of total 
variance of a firm’s environmental actions.      
 Lastly, this study, observing and testing the effect of a technological disaster, contributed 
to advancing our understandings of how firms engage differentially in environmental actions in 
periods of crisis by looking into the process of environmental decision-making of a firm.  Walls, 
Berrone, and Phan (2012) examined the effect of corporate governance on environmental 
strengths, assessed by a firm’s capability to improve environmental performance, and on 
environmental concerns, operationalized by pollution prevention that provides organizations with 
some advantages (Christamann, 2000; Klassen & Whybark, 1999).  They found that board 
independence positively affects environmental concerns or problems.  Meanwhile, CEO duality 
had no direct effect on pollution prevention.          
Theoretical Implications 
 There are several important theoretical implications to this study.  First, firms are taking 
two possible environmental strategic actions: developing environmental competency and keeping 
organizational legitimacy (Barreto, 2013).  It is noteworthy to note that the fundamental reason 
behind this strategic choice lies in the assumption that attention to natural environmental issues is 
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a relatively limited resource compared to attention to competitive environmental issues.  In this 
study, having this limited and selective attention, a TMT tends to engage in protective 
environmental actions rather than preventive environmental actions in response to threats from a 
technological disaster.  The findings are consistent with Sharma, Pablo, and Vredenburg (1999) 
discussion that a firm’s preventive actions are associated with opportunities while its protective 
actions are associated with threats.   
Second, research into attention can bridge between organizations and general 
environments.  External environments consist of general, industry, and competitor environments.  
These sub-external environments are conceptually aligned, and there are different dominant 
theories for each environment.  Firms can identify threats and opportunities that are unequally 
distributed in the general environment. As the likelihood of effectively capturing opportunities 
and neutralizing threats depends on the extent to which firms are concerned about (Dibrell et al., 
2014), learn about, and attend to the changes in general environment, attention should be a good 
cognitive instrument that links firms with opportunities to explore and threats to prevent.  
Therefore, the attention-based view can contribute to explaining why firms vary in responding to 
an unexpected event in the general environment using three principles of attention.    
 Third, attention-based view complements the limitations of formalized decision making 
process in a highly uncertain environment.  The latter assumes that managers go through 
scanning, understanding, evaluating, and forecasting external and internal environments in a 
rational manner, and design and implement strategies with the results of the SWOT analysis.  
The formalized approach to strategy efficiently leads to a firm’s actions and reactions against 
events (e.g., changes in forces from competitors, buyers, suppliers, and regulators) that happen in 
competitor and industry environments.  Meanwhile, the formalized process of strategic decision 
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making is limited in focusing resources and efforts on a few issues in the highly uncertain 
environments driven by sudden and low-probability events from general environments including 
a technological disaster.  The attention-based view that partially adopts a sensemaking process 
(Weick, 1995) suggests that social salience of a technological disaster elicit firms to enact their 
environment and to give meanings to prioritized issues by categorizing and labeling unequivocal 
issues, thus helping organizations make more sense of events that might not have been attended.  
Therefore, the attention-based view is anticipated to continue to provide a theoretical lens to look 
into the areas where strategies developed from a formalized decision-making process could not 
reach.    
Managerial Implication 
 Management studies have been mainly conducted with micro-level management research 
into HR and macro-level management research into strategy divided.  Meanwhile, businesses are 
moving forward with the two domains integrated by having a TMT rationally attend to the voices 
of employees (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) and to stakeholders (Hart, 1995).  The failure to 
coordinate the integrative process of creating and attending issues is known to harm 
organizational change (Dutton et al., 2001). 
 It is notable that the a top-down attention-making process might bias an organizational 
attention to the issues that come from the bottom of its organization by providing a TMT with a 
firm’s specific value, rules, and norms.  It indicates the attention is focused not on the content of 
issues but on the source of attention.  Internal powers tend to be concentrated to those who can 
promote issues in an organization, as insiders understand that their proposed issues are 
effectively attended by a TMT when they are endorsed by those having an internal power.   
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 Given that a primary goal of a firm is to maintain a competitive advantage by nurturing 
competitiveness, the emergence of a powerful coalition that has no association with pursuing the 
organizational goal is referred to as organizational politics (Chang, Rosen, & Levy, 2009).  
When insiders are not aligned with strategy but follow those who can create issues in an 
organization, organizational politics often end up dominating an organizational strategy that is 
necessary for effective decision-making.  In sum, this study implies that biased TMT attention by 
corporate governance is the manifestation of relying on the source of issues, instead of its 
content, thus harming a firm’s capability to cope with external changes and identify opportunities      
 Second, although a number of governmental policies and regulations favorable to 
stakeholders have been enacted and try to improve communal environments, the key group 
which accepts and applies institutions to strategic management process is a TMT (Hiatt & Park, 
2013) and its attention determines the level and type of environmental actions to implement, as 
hypothesized.  I provided a framework for how to develop environmentally responsible firms 
considering corporate governance and vicarious learning.  Understanding the mechanism by 
which TMT attention to natural environment is created and leads to the action will help 
regulatory agencies responsible for exercising environmental policies predict the possibility that 
firms faithfully comply with environmental regulations and practices. 
Limitation & Future Study 
 First, limited data availability constrained me to select sample firms only from five 
different industries.  Particularly, as a database for my dependent variable, TRI database, 
annually reported to the US EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), was available only for 
industries falling under the SIC first-two-digit codes from 20 to 50.   This selection issue left 
limitation in external validity. 
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 Second, following Cho & Hambrick (2006), I used 838 LTSs and analyzing its content 
was an appropriate approach to assessing and identifying TMT attention to natural environmental 
issues.  As there was no systematic approach to studying and measuring organization-level 
attention to natural environmental issues, I assume that the construct is a unidimensional.  
However, given that its attention is the product of environmental concerns, conviction, and 
champion that encourage a firm to be environmentally responsible, it must be worthwhile to 
break down the construct further. 
 Although I developed the measurement of TMT attention in an inductive approach after 
assessing a sample firm’s LTSs, I found some possibilities that the uni-dimensionality of TMT 
attention to natural environmental issues might be segmented into three components based on 
Scott’s (2003) classification of institution: TMT attention to regulative environmental issues, 
TMT attention to normative environmental issues, and TMT attention to cultural environmental 
issues.   TMT attention to regulative environmental issues indicates the noticing and encoding 
environmental regulations that look most salient in its business situation and interpreting them as 
the concerns that have coercively regulated and legally sanctioned.  The words
5
 for this category 
include, for instance, ‘clean air act’, ‘clean air regulation’, ‘environmental law’, ‘environmental 
regulation’, ‘environmental protection agency’, ‘federal energy regulatory commission’, 
‘wildlife conservation’, ‘toxic release inventory’, ‘national environmental policy’, ‘Kyoto 
treaty’, ‘ISO 14001’, ‘hydrocarbon law’, ‘environmental policy’, ‘coalition for environmentally 
responsible economies’, etc.            
 TMT attention to normative environmental issues indicates the noticing and encoding 
environmental social expectation that look most salient in its business situation, interpreting 
                                                          
5
 The listed words are not exhaustive.  Detailed explanations for the list of the words representing TMT attention to 
natural environmental issues are available from the author upon request. 
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them as the concerns that have normatively regulated and morally governed, and focusing its 
attention on the corresponding solutions.  The words for this category include, for instance, 
‘accident prevention’, ‘air and fuel management’, ‘biodegradable’, ‘clean coal technology’, 
‘clean energy’, ‘clean burning’, ‘community-based health program’, ‘cradle-to-cradle’, 
‘environmental annual report’, ‘environmental practice’, ‘ forest management’, ‘forest 
stewardship advisory’, ‘green diesel technology’, ‘groundwater treatment’, ‘pollution control’, 
‘pollution prevention’, ‘recycle’, ‘renewable’, ‘sustainability report’, ‘sustainable forestry 
initiative’, ‘ voluntary industrial toxics reduction’, ‘waste processing’, ‘water treatment’, etc. 
 TMT attention to cultural-cognitive environmental issues indicates the noticing and 
encoding environmental taken-for-granted understandings that firms culturally support for 
communal environments.  The words for this category include, for instance, ‘a sense of 
stewardship’, ‘accountability’, ‘citizen’s health’, ‘clean healthy environment’, ‘cleaner and 
healthier place’, ‘commitment to the environment’, ‘community support’, ‘corporate citizenship’, 
‘corporate social responsibility’, ‘duties and obligations of stewardship’, ‘environmental and 
safety advance’, ‘environmental social performance’, ‘environmental benefit’, ‘environmental 
concern’, ‘environmental cost’, ‘environmental excellence’, ‘environmental impact’, 
‘environmental leadership’, ‘environmental stewardship’, ‘global climate’, ‘impact on the 
environment’, ‘responsible public citizen’, ‘safety, health and environmental performance’, 
‘sustainable development’, ‘value to their community’, ‘welling being of the community’, etc.        
 The classification might provide an insight into how TMT attention to natural 
environmental issues did not mediate the relationship between the disaster and preventive 
/protective environmental actions, as indicated by the tests for hypotheses 11 and 12.  The 
sample firms tend to use cultural-cognitive natural environmental issue in the most various forms 
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of words and phrases (n=326) followed by normative natural environmental issues (n=138) and 
regulative natural environmental issues (n=103).   The results indicate that it might be more 
convenient for TMT to use cognitive natural environmental issues than normative and regulative 
ones, since TMT can exhibit its belief in the importance of nurturing communal environments 
that might positively impress stakeholders and express the priority of shareholder’s interest by 
signaling that its environmental actions are too much to harm financial performance. 
 Meanwhile, normative and regulative natural environmental issues entail detailed 
information on the milestones of planned actions, relevant organizations, and expected outcomes.  
The details might be the manifestation of TMT’s environmental concerns and confidence on the 
situations surrounding it firm, given that TMT is supposed to summary its primary attention only 
on 2 to 4 pages.  It could imply that TMT attention to cognitive natural environmental issues 
focuses on how its firms look environmentally responsible by exhibiting its attention to natural 
environment, whereas TMT attention to regulative/normative natural environmental issues 
focuses on how its resources and capabilities address environmental concerns by doing so 
(Barreto, 2013).  I anticipate that using segmented measures of TMT attention will improve the 
nomological validity on the relationship between TMT attention and protective/preventive 
actions in the future research.  Additionally, the moderating effect of vicarious learning on TMT 
attention is also anticipated to be more effectively identified.  
CONCLUSION 
 This study focused on how a technological disaster affects TMT attention to the natural 
environment, which, in turn, leads to environmental actions and what conditions differentially 
increase the effect of technological disaster on a firm’s environmental action, as mediated by 
TMT attention.  I found empirical support for the ideas that a firm’s environmental actions 
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seeking legitimacy depends on the extent to which TMT concerns about environments are 
enhanced by corporate governance such as ownership dispersal, outside directors, and family 
influence.  These factors effectively influence a TMT to make more sense of the adverse impact 
of a technological disaster on organizational legitimacy, and the structural attention leads to a 
firm’s protective environmental actions.  Meanwhile, the association between TMT attention and 
a firm’s proactive environmental actions seeking environmental competency was not found in 
this study.  The findings provide some insights into how environmentally responsible firms are 
nurtured and why a disastrous event leads to different environmental actions across firms.      
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Comparison of Definitions for Technological Disasters & Natural Disasters:  
Technological Disaster 
 
 
 Technological Disaster 
Domains Source Definitions 
Non-Academic 
Areas 
National Science and 
Technology Council’s 
Subcommittee on Disaster 
Reduction (SDR ) 
“Technological hazards involve the release of 
hazardous substances that impact human health and 
safety, the environment, and/or the local 
Economy. Hazardous substances are chemicals, toxic 
substances, gasoline and oil, nuclear and radiological 
material, and flammable and explosive materials, in 
the form of gases, liquids, or solids” (Section for 
Technological Disaster, 2008: p. 1) 
Non-
Management 
Area 
Pidgeon & O'Leary (2000, 
p.16) 
 
Gill & Picou (2008, p.796) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baum et al. (1983) 
“significant disruption or collapse of the existing 
cultural beliefs and norms about hazards” 
 
“… occur when breakdowns in technological and 
bureaucratic organization systems lead to destruction 
or contamination of the natural and built environment.  
Most technological disasters involve contamination of 
the 
environment that challenges individuals' fundamental 
expectations regarding their relationship with nature” 
 
Malfunction of a vast technological network of power 
generating, production, and waste disposal system 
Management 
Area 
Robert (1990: p. 164) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richardson (1994: p. 41) 
Caused by “the technological failures that combined 
with human and organizational factors to produce the 
accident and were unanticipated interactions among 
multiple failures in the system, tight coupling, design 
flaws in the plant, the use of defective or 
malfunctioning equipment, the use of 
contaminated or sub standard supplies and raw 
material, and the use of incorrect operating 
procedures” 
 
“which cause extensive damage and social disruption, 
involve multiple stakeholders and  unfold through 
complex technological, organizational and social 
processes” 
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Comparison of Definitions for Technological Disasters & Natural Disasters: 
 Natural Disaster 
 
 
 Natural Disaster 
Domains Source Definitions 
Non-Academic 
Areas 
US EPA; Federal 
Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) 
 
 
Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED) 
 
 
 
 
Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) 
Classifying natural disaster into drought, earthquakes, 
extreme cold, extreme heat, fires, floods, hurricanes, 
landslides and debris flow, tornadoes, tsunamis, and 
volcanoes 
 
When an natural event fulfills at least one of following 
criteria, it qualifies as a disaster: 10 or more people 
are reported killed; 100 or more people are reported 
affected, injured, and/or homeless; the government 
declares a state of emergency; the government 
requests international assistance 
 
“Disaster can strike people in any community at any 
time, building slowly, or striking suddenly without 
warning.”  DHS definition includes both natural 
disasters and acts of terrorism. 
Non-
Management 
Area 
Kreps (1984, p. 312) 
 
 
 
 
Alcantara-Ayala (2002, 
p.112) 
“events, observable in time and space, in which 
societies or their subunits (e.g., communities, regions) 
incur physical damages and losses and/or disruption of 
their routine functioning” 
 
“some rapid, instantaneous or profound impact of the 
natural environment upon the socio-economic system, 
or as a suddenly disequilibrium of the balance 
between the forces released by the natural system and 
the counteracting forces of the social system” 
Management 
Area 
Winn et al., (2011: p. 161) 
 
 
 
 
Oh & Oetzel (2011: p. 660) 
Massive Discontinuous Change “significant, sudden, 
disruptive change in the broader ecological or social 
systems of which organizations and economic systems 
are a part” 
 
Significant and sudden disruptions ignited by an 
unprecedented and unpredictable natural event (i.e., 
act of God) including “drought, earthquakes, 
epidemics, extreme temperatures, floods, insect 
infestations, mudslides, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, 
and wild fires”  
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SIC 26: Pulp/Paper/Stationery Products
6
 
 
Unit: Millions of Dollars 
Name  
 
Revenue (1995) Ticker Name 
 
Revenue(1995) Ticker 
Int’l Paper co. 
19797 IP 
Domtar Inc.  
2795 DTC 
Kimberly-Clark Corp 
13788 KMB 
Sonoco Products co 
2706 SON 
3M 
13460 MMM 
Bowater Inc 
2001 BOW 
Weyerhaeuser co 
11788 WY 
Potlatch corp. 
1605 PCH 
Tenneco Inc. 
8899 TEN 
Bemis co 
1523 BMS 
Boise Cascade corp. 
5074 BCC Rayonier Inc 
 
1260 RYN 
W R Grace & co. 
3665 GRA Rock-Tenn co 
 
902 RKT 
Temple Inland Inc 
3460 TIN 
Caraustar Industries  
544 CSARQ 
Avery Dennison corp. 
3113 AVY 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 As of 1995, the above 18 firms were primarily engaged in paper industry such as paper coated and laminated 
(2672), paperboard mills (2631), pulp mills (2611), and corrugated and solid fiber boxes (2653).  Among them, six 
firms transformed their primary businesses during the observation period from 1995 to 2004; W R Grace shifted 
from 2671 to 2819 (Industrial Inorganic Chemicals) in 1998, 3M shifted from 2672 to 2891(Adhesives and sealants) 
in 2002, Weyerhaeuser shifted from 2621 to 0811 (Timber Tracts) in 2002, Tenneco from 2653 to 3714 (Motor 
Vehicle Parts and Accessories) in 2002, Potlatch from 2631 to 2435 (Hardwood Veneer and Plywood) in 1998 and 
back to 2611 (pulp mills) in 2002, and Rayonier from 2611 to 2823 (Cellulostic Manmade Fibers) in 2002 and to 
6798 (real estate investment). 
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SIC 28: Plastic Materials/Chemical Manufacturing/Pharmaceutical Preparation/Paint & Coating 
Manufacturing) 
 
Unit: Millions of Dollars 
Name Revenue (1995) Ticker Name 
Revenue 
(1995) 
Ticker 
Procter & Gamble Co. 
33434 PG Baxter International 
Inc 
5048 BAX 
Akzo Nobel NV.  
21488 AKZOY Eastman Chemical 
Co. 
5040 EMN 
Dow Chemical Co 
20261 DOW 
FMC Corp 
4509 FMC 
Johnson & Johnson 
18842 JNJ 
Avon Products Inc 
4492 AVP 
Merck & Co Inc 
16681 MRK 
Rohm & Haas Co. 
3884 ROH 
Bristol-Myers Squibb co. 
13767 BMY Air Products & 
Chemicals Inc.  
3865 APD 
Pfizer Inc. 
10021 PFE 
Olin Corp 
3150 OLN 
Abbott Laboratories 
17685 ABT 
Praxair Inc.  
3146 PX 
Monsanto Co 
8962 MON Estee Lauder Cos 
Inc 
2899 EL 
Colgate-Palmolive Co.  
8358 CL 
Amgen Inc 
1818 AMGN 
PPG industries inc 
7057 PPG International Flavors 
& Fragra 
1439 IFF 
Lilly (Eli) & co. 
6763 LLY 
Ferro Corp 
1322 FOE 
Schering Plough Corp.  
5014 SGP    
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SIC 29: Petroleum Refining/Asphalt Paving Mixtures/Lubricating Oils/Petroleum & Coal 
Products
7
 
 
Unit: Millions of Dollars 
Name 
Revenue(1995) Ticker 
Name 
Revenue(1995) Ticker 
Mobil Corp 
73413 MOB Valero Energy Corp 
 
3019 VLO 
Du Pont (EI) De 
Nemours 
 
42163 DD 
Pennzoil Co. 2385 
PZL 
British Petroleum Co 
36106 BP 
Lubrizol Corp. 1983 
LZ 
 
Conocophiliips 
 
13368 COP 
EMCO Ltd 1086 
EMLTF 
Ashland Inc 
 
12167 ASH Quaker State Corp 
 
1035 
KSF 
Occidental Petroleum 
Corp 
10423 OXY 
Tesoro Petroleum 
Corp 
7119 
TSO 
Unocal Crop 8133 
UCL Holly Frontier Corp. 
 
613 
HFC 
Hess Corp 
 
7302 HES Quaker Chemical 
Corp 
227 
KWR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 For SIC 29 (Oil and Gas), mergers and acquisitions frequently occurred, particularly early in 2000s.  Therefore, I 
briefly describe the history of the M&As related to sample firms in SIC 29. 
Hess Corporation (HES) 
In 1919, Amerada Corporation was formed by British oil entrepreneurs.  In 1996, Hess Oil and Chemical acquired 
10% of Amerada Corporation, and in May 2006, Amerada Hess Corp, changed its name to Hess Crop.   
Exxon Mobile Corp (XOM) 
It was formed in November, 1999, by the merger of Exxon (formerly Standard Oil) and Mobil (Formerly Standard 
Oil of New Jersey).   
ChevronTexaco Corp (CVX) 
In October, 2000, Chevron announced acquisition of Texaco and the new firm was named ChevronTexaco, which 
returned to the Chevron name in May, 2005.  Therefore, the official name was Chevrontexaco Corp. from 2000 to 
2005. 
Conocophillips (COP) 
It was created through the merger of Conoco inc., which was founded in 1875, and the Phillips Petroleum Co., 
founded in 1917, in August, 2002.   
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SIC 37: Motor Vehicles/Aircraft Engines & Parts/Shipbuilding & Railroad Equipment 
/Transportation Equipment 
 
Unit: Millions of Dollars 
Names 
Revenue(1995) Ticker 
Names 
Revenue(1995) Ticker 
General Motors co.  
168828 GM 
Gencorp inc 1772 
GY 
Ford Motor Co.  
137137 F 
A O Smith Corp  1544 
AOS 
United Technologies 
Corp 
22802 UTX 
Sequa Corp 1414 
SQAB 
Boeing Co.  
19515 BA 
Harley Davison Inc. 4090.9 
HOG 
Lockheed Corp.  
13130 LMT Alliant Techsystems 
Inc.  
2172.1 
ATK 
Textron Inc.  
9973 TXT Polaris Industries 
inc 
1113 
PII 
Dana corp. 
7786 DAN 
Terex Corp 1030 
TEX 
Navistar International 
Corp 
6292 NAV 
Teleflex Inc.  2076.2 
TFX 
Paccar inc. 
4848 PCAR Standard Motor 
Products Inc 
663 
SMP 
Magna International Inc 
4512 MGA 
Thor Industries inc 562 
THO 
General Dynamics corp. 3067 
GD Winnebago 
Industries inc 
484 
WGO 
Trinity Industries inc 2496 
TRN Oshkosh Truck 
Corp.  
437 
OSK 
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SIC 49: Electric Services/Gas Transmission/Utilities)
8
 
Unit: Millions of Dollars 
Names 
Revenue (1995) Ticker 
Names 
Revenue (1995) Ticker 
Southern Co. 
9180 SO 
DTE Energy Co.  
3635 DTE 
Edison International.  
8405 EIX 
Cinergy Corp. 
3031 CIN 
Entergy Corp.  
6274 ETR Wisconsin Energy 
Corp 
1770 WEC 
Public Service Enterprise 
group 
6164 PEG Pinnacle West 
Capital Corp 
1669 PNW 
American Electric Power 
Co.  
5670 AEP 
Teco Energy Inc 
1392 TE 
FPL Group, inc. 
(Formerly, Nextra 
Energy Resource) 
5592 NEE Hawaiian Electric 
Industries 
1295 HE 
Duke Energy Corp.  
4676 DUK Waste Management 
Inco.  
1144 WM 
Dominion Resources Inc.  
4651 D Portland General 
electric 
983 POR 
CMS Energy Corp 
3890 CMS 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Unlike other industries where a majority of firms were operating in the US, this industry includes many of large-
cap firms which were publicly traded in the US but were being operated out of the US.  So, I selected sample firms 
of this industry from top 150 firms in the basis of revenue as of 1995, which doubled 75 targeted firms for each of 
other industries.       
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTER IN FIVE INDUSTRIES 
 DURING OBSERVATION PERIOD FROM 1994 TO 2003
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List of Technological Disaster in Five Industries  
During Observation Period from 1994 to 2003 
 
Type of Disaster: Industrial Accident (Explosion; Chemical Spill; Gas Leak; Fire) and Transport 
Accident (Chemical/Oil/Gas Spill) 
 
Date Location 
(Neighbor States) 
Type Relevant 
Organization 
Damages Related 
Industry 
Disaster 
No. 
Jan 
29 
2003 
Kinston near 
Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina (Virginia, 
Tennessee, South 
Carolina, Georgia) 
Explosion of 
Pharmaceutics Factory 
caused by an 
accumulation of 
combustible 
polyethelene  powder 
West 
Pharmaceutical 
Service (publicly 
traded firm): 
manufacturer of 
pharmaceutical 
packing (e.g., 
plastic 
packaging) and 
delivery 
6 killed 36 
injured 
SIC 28 2003-
0070 
Sep 
23 
2001 
Brookwood 
Alabama 
(Mississippi, 
Tennessee, 
Georgia, Florida) 
Explosion of Coal Mine 
Blue Creek (i.e., gas 
explosion) caused by 
methane gas 
Jim Walter 
Resource Blue 
Creek No. 5 
Mine (Non 
publicly traded): 
Southernmost  
Appalachian coal 
producer for use 
in electric 
generating plants 
13 Killed 3 
injured 
SIC 29;  2001-
0569 
Aug 
19 
2000 
Fatal Carlsbad 
New Mexico 
(Arizona, Utah, 
Colorado, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Texas) 
Explosion of Natural 
gas pipeline explosion 
and a transmission 
pipeline ruptured; 
blamed on corrosion in 
a 50-year old pipe. 
El Paso Natural 
gas (L.L.C) 
12 Killed 2 
injured; 
property and 
other 
damages or 
losses 
totaled 
$998.296; 
steel 
suspension 
bridges 
damaged 
SIC 49 2000-
0512 
May 
27 
2000 
Eunice, South-
West Louisiana 
(Texas, Oklahoma, 
Arkansas,  
Mississippi) 
Derailment of Union 
Pacific Railroad Train 
and oil spill due to poor 
track conditions of the 
Union Pacific 
Union Pacific 
Railroad 
(Publicly Traded 
Firm; owner is 
unknown) 
3500 
evacuated; 
total 
damages 
exceeds $35 
million areas 
polluted by 
hazardous 
materials 
and residue 
SIC 29   2000-
0319 
 
Dec 
8 
1998 
Saluda Western 
North Carolina 
(Virginia, 
Tennessee, South 
Highly volatile and 
toxic Chemical Spill 
(Sodium Hydrosulfite) 
A tractor-trailer 
(Non publicly 
traded firm) 
100 
affected;  
SIC 28 1998-
0412 
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Carolina, Georgia) 
Oct 
19 
1998 
Highland Pierron 
Illinois 
(Wisconsin, Iowa, 
Missouri, 
Kentucky, India, 
Michigan)  
Chemical Spill 
(Sulfuric Acid) caused 
by derailment 
Conrail (Non 
publicly traded 
corporation) 
200 affected SIC 28 1998-
0318 
Oct 7 
1998 
Portland 
Pennsylvania 
(New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, 
Maryland, Ohio, 
West Virginia, 
Virginia)  
Chemical Spill 
(Sulfuric Acid; sodium 
hydroxide) to Clarion 
River  
Genesee & 
Wyoming 
industries 
(publicly traded 
firm) 
100 affected SIC 28 1998-
0305 
Sep 
2 
1998 
Harper County 
Texas (New 
Mexico, Colorado, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, 
Arkansas,  
Louisiana) 
Chemical Spill (Nitric 
acid, sodium 
hydroxide) 
Burlington 
Northern and 
Santa Fe 
(Publicly traded 
firm; owner is 
unknown) 
350 affected SIC 28 1998-
0285 
July 
1 
1998 
North Carolina 
(Virginia, 
Tennessee,  
Georgia, South 
Carolina) 
Mislocating 2-inch gas 
lines and the 
construction company 
later bit when digging 
N.C. Natural Gas 
(Publicly Traded 
Firm) 
400 affected SIC 49 1998-
0196 
 
Jun 
22 
1998 
Derailed at Cox 
Landing, West 
Virginia 
(Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Kentucky, 
Virginia, 
Maryland, 
Delaware)  
Chemical spill of 
21,550 gallons of 
Formaldehyde 
CSX 
Transportation 
(publicly traded 
firm; owner is 
unknown) 
512 
affected; 
total 
damages 
exceeded 
$2.6 
millions  
SIC 28 1998-
0195 
Feb 
26 
1998 
Pocasset, 
Oklahoma (Texas, 
New Mexico, 
Colorado, Kansas, 
Missouri, 
Arkansas, 
Louisiana)   
Fire of Baroid’s metal 
building that contained 
caustic soda, potassium 
hydroxide, and highly 
corrosive compounds 
Baroid’s Drilling 
fluids inc. (a 
worldwide 
drilling fluids 
company, a 
division of 
Dresser 
Industries Inc; 
non public traded 
firm.) 
500 affected SIC 29 1998-
0058 
Sep 
10 
1997 
Columbus Ohio 
(Michigan, 
Indiana, Kentucky, 
West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, New 
York)  
Explosion of Chemical 
factory, causing a 
phenol/formaldehyde 
resin mixture over the 
grounds 
Georgia Pacific 
Corporation 
(publicly traded 
firm) 
 
25 killed 8 
injured; 
degradation 
of 
neighbors’ 
health and 
property 
SIC 28 1997-
0370 
July 
19 
1997 
Flora Mississippi 
(Louisiana, 
Arkansas, 
Crews used and destroy 
tanker cars carrying a 
flammable liquid 
Dupont (Publicly 
Traded Firm) 
6000 
affected 
SIC 28 1997-
0198 
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Tennessee, 
Alabama)  
chemical and 6,000 
residents were ordered 
out of their homes  
Apr 
11 
1996 
Alberton Montana 
(Idaho, Wyoming, 
South Dakota, 
North Dakota, 
Washington) 
Gas Leak (Chlorine 
gas) caused by the 
derailment and emitting 
poisonous chlorine gas 
Burlington 
Northern and 
Santa Fe 
(Publicly traded 
firm, but owner 
unknown) 
1092 
affected 
SIC 28 1996-
0076 
July 
25 
1995 
Texas City Texas 
(New Mexico, 
Colorado, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, 
Arkansas,  
Louisiana) 
Explosion of Refinery BP (Amoco) 
Publicly traded 
firms 
105 injured;  SIC 29 1995-
0160 
Feb 
28 
1995 
Minneapolis 
Minnesota  (North 
Dakota, South 
Dakota, Iowa, 
Wisconsin) 
Fire of Chemical supply 
company causing a 
noxious cloud of 
chlorine fumes  
Hawkins 
Chemical Co.: 
Non public firms 
200 injured SIC 28 1995-
0039 
Dec 
6 
1994 
Samson Alabama 
(Mississippi, 
Tennessee, North 
Carolina, Georgia, 
Florida) 
Fire of Plastic pipe 
factory causing toxins 
that irritate residents’ 
lungs and eyes 
Samson Plastic 
Pipe company 
using the 
chemical 
Azodicarbonami
de to make PVC 
pipes: Non 
public firms 
3000 
affected 
SIC 28 1994-
0592 
Oct 
21 
1994 
Houston, Texas 
(New Mexico, 
Colorado, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, 
Arkansas,  
Louisiana) 
Gas Leak of 8 Pipe 
Line due to lack of 
effective operational 
monitoring or pipeline 
and of automatic 
operated valves to 
allow for prompt 
detection of product 
release 
Exxon Pipeline 
company; 
Colonial’s 
(Publicly traded 
firm) 
530 affected SIC 28 1994-
0544 
Jun 
13 
1994 
Allentown 
Pennsylvania (New 
York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, 
Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, 
Maryland, Ohio, 
West Virginia, 
Virginia) 
Servicemen for a local 
gas utility arrived at the 
scene in response to gas 
odour reports, but 
without the correct tool 
to turn off the line. 
UGI Utilities 
Inc., publicly 
traded firm 
1 killed 379 
injured 
SIC 49 1994-
0141 
May 
27 
1994 
Belpre Ohio 
(Michigan, 
Indiana, Kentucky, 
West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, New 
York) 
Explosion of Chemical 
Plant; causing 
cyclohexane & styrene 
monomers to release 
Shell Chemical 
Co. producing a 
thermosplastic 
rubber, publicly 
traded firm 
3 killed 
1700 
affected 
SIC 29 1994-
0136 
APR 
14 
1994 
Balch Springs 
Texas (New 
Mexico, Colorado, 
Explosion of a truck 
loaded with pesticide 
crashed into a highway 
Non publicly 
traded firm 
 
4000 
affected 
SIC 28 1994-
0109 
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Kansas, Oklahoma, 
Arkansas,  
Louisiana) 
sign, spewing a cloud 
of toxic smoke and 
causing respiratory 
problems 
Mar 
24 
1994 
Edison area New 
Jersey 
(Connecticut, New 
York, 
Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, 
Maryland)  
Explosion of a gas 
pipeline damaged by 
intense pressure from 
repeated use of 
construction equipment 
Texas Eastern 
Transmission, 
owned by spectra 
energy, which is 
publicly traded 
firm 
1 killed 58 
injured 
SIC 49 1994-
0085 
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